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CHOICE-OF-LA W PROBLEMS
I. INTRODUCTION
THIS ARTICLE had its genesis in a lawyer's nightmare,
namely, the possibility of facing the daunting array of
choice-of-law problems, which might arise in litigation fol-
lowing a major air catastrophe. For example, in In re Air
Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Illinois on May 25, 1979,1 the
Multidistrict Litigation court was confronted with one-
hundred-eighteen wrongful death actions which were
originally filed in six states, including plaintiffs and dece-
dents residing in ten states, as well as Puerto Rico, Japan,
the Netherlands, and Saudi Arabia. The complaints al-
leged causes of action for wrongful death and survival
based on negligence and strict liability and sought com-
pensatory and punitive damages.2 Crashes leaving survi-
vors are likely to raise additional causes of action such as
loss of society, loss of consortium, and battery. In addi-
tion, issues may arise involving such damage-measuring
or damage-limiting questions as prejudgment interest;
measurement of compensatory damages (that is, present
value and, in death cases, deduction of projected taxes,
deduction of projected self-support costs, hedonic dam-
ages, and damages for pre-impact fear); as well as ques-
tions concerning the availability and limitations upon
punitive damages and application of the Warsaw
Convention.3
Visions of the simultaneous appearance of these choice
of law problems-and perhaps others mercifully not
dreamed of-prompted the preparation of this article,
which has two purposes: 1) to develop approaches to the
solution of some specific choice issues which may arise,
and in the process, 2) to illustrate modes of analysis that
1 644 F.2d 594 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 878 (1981) [hereinafter Air Crash
Chicago].
2 Id. at 604.
1 This article does not treat any aspect of the Warsaw Convention. The reader
is referred to LAWRENCE B. GOLDHIRSCH, THE WARSAW CONVENTION ANNOTATED:
A LEGAL HANDBOOK (1988); RENE H. MANKIEWICZ, THE LIABILITY REGIME OF THE
INTERNATIONAL AIR CARRIER (1981); GEORGETTE MILLER, LIABILITY IN INTERNA-
TIONAL AIR TRANSPORT: THE WARSAW SYSTEM IN MUNICIPAL COURTS (1977).
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might be helpful in the solution of other choice issues.
Although written from the point of view of an airline de-
fending such litigation, the approach to parsing choice-of-
law problems may be helpful in general. Certainly, many
of the suggestions may be applicable to the defense of
other kinds of businesses, particularly those operating on
a national scale.4
The aim throughout the article is to resist the tempta-
tion to play games with this sometimes convoluted and
frustrating subject and to develop stances which are ana-
lytically defensible within the confines of present choice of
law rules.5 With respect to compensatory damages, for
example, the sensible choice of the injured person's domi-
ciliary law can be either advantageous or disadvantageous
to the airline. Counsel would invite trouble by attempting
a piecemeal approach seeking the most advantageous law
in regard to each individual plaintiff.
The material in the article is grounded upon a basic cat-
egorization of choice of law problems and principles dis-
tilled from existing precedent. With the exception of
punitive and compensatory damages, the approaches to
particular problems do not purport to constitute tradi-
tional legal arguments based upon research of existing
authority. Instead, they attempt to illustrate how estab-
lished, basic principles may be used to develop logical
choice of law solutions. In any case, the practitioner will
have to thoroughly research the particular problem at
hand.
4 Of course, in non-aviation cases, the place of the injury may not be fortuitous,
as it frequently is in air crashes. This difference can be crucial, particularly in
regard to issues concerning conduct. See infra notes 102-28 and accompanying
text (discussion of punitive damages).
- In Air Crash Chicago Judge Sprecher lamented the choice-of-law complications
necessitated by the fact that "[a]irline corporations and airplane manufacturers
are subject to uniform federal regulation in almost every aspect of their opera-
tions, except their liability in tort." Air Crash Chicago, 644 F.2d at 632. As Judge
Sprecher noted, however, "it is up to Congress, and not the courts, to create the
needed uniform law." Id. at 633. There is no shortage of commentary on the
existing insecurity and waste inherent in present choice-of-law rules. See, e.g.,
Michael H. Gottesman, Draining The Dismal Swamp: The Case For Federal Choice Of
Law Statutes, 80 GEO. L.J. 1 (1991).
CHOICE-OF-LA W PROBLEMS
For the sake of manageability, this article assumes liti-
gation in federal court based upon the principles of the
"most significant relationship" test of the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS. 6 The springboard for
the discussions of the various topics is Air Crash Chicago.7
Anyone confronted with choice of law problems in tort
litigation should digest this case thoroughly because it ex-
emplifies principles that are generally applicable beyond
the punitive-damages issue in the case.
II. BASIC PRINCIPLES: A BROAD DESCRIPTION
OF AN APPROACH TO CHOICE PROBLEMS
A. CHOICE-OF-LAw RULE APPLIED IN FEDERAL
DIVERSITY CASES
In diversity actions, federal courts employ the choice-
of-law rules of the forum state.'
B. CHOICE-OF-LAw RULE IN MULTI-DISTRICT LITIGATION
When a case is transferred from one federal court to
another-for example, from one of a number of trans-
feror courts to a single Multidistrict Litigation (MDL)
court-the transferee court must apply the choice of law
rules of the state where the transferor court sits.9
C. RULE OF DEFAULT
In the Seventh Circuit, it is established that when par-
ties to a diversity suit fail to specify that the forum state's
choice-of-law rules require the application of another
state's substantive law, the forum state's own substantive
law applies. 10 The law of the circuit in which a particular
case is filed should be researched in regard to this waiver
6 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145(2) (1971) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT].
7 644 F.2d 594 (7th Cir. 1981).
8 Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941).
9 Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 639 (1964); Air Crash Chicago, 644 F.2d at
610.
10 In re Iowa R.R., 840 F.2d 535, 543 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 899 (1988);
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argument." If the law of a state other than the forum is
asserted, the choice-of-law inquiry must begin with the
identification and understanding of the forum state's
choice-of-law rule. 12
D. CHOICE-OF-LAw STANDARDS IN GENERAL
There are two general categories of choice rules:
1) those that simply apply the substantive law of a particu-
lar place, for example, the place of the accident or of the
forum and 2) those that require some kind of analysis of
the interests and policies of the jurisdictions that are con-
nected to the parties, the conduct and the occurrence.
1. Lex Loci Delicti and Lex Fori
Although they are in a distinct minority, some states
continue to adhere to the old lex loci delicti as their choice
rule.' 3 The lex loci may or may not be advantageous to a
defending airline.' 4 When the forum state's lex loci rule is
National Ass'n of Sporting Goods Wholesalers, Inc. v. F.T.L. Mktg. Corp., 779
F.2d 1281, 1284-85 (7th Cir. 1985).
'1 See, e.g., Holloway v. Heci Exploration Co. Employees' Profit Sharing Plan, 76
B.R. 563, 572 (N.D. Tex. 1987), aff'd, 862 F.2d 513 (5th Cir. 1988) (adopting a
similar rule).
12 This inquiry of course will be unnecessary in regard to actions based upon
federal law. For example, many states' Deceptive Trade Practices statutes incor-
porate federal law.
All of the states' choice-of-law rules as of 1990, as well as their rules concerning
several other issues (for example, rules governing wrongful death actions, and
survival actions, contribution, and indemnity) are compiled in 1 DEFENSE RE-
SEARCH INST., A COMPENDIUM OF STATE LAwS FOR AVIATION PRACTITIONERS (1990)
(a special publication of the Defense Research Institute, 750 North Lake Shore
Drive, Suite 500, Chicago Illinois 60611).
1- See, e.g., Spencer v. Malone Freight Lines, 298 So. 2d 20, 22 (Ala. 1974);
Risdon Enters., Inc. v. Colemill Enters., Inc., 324 S.E.2d 738, 740 (Ga. Ct. App.
1984) (declining to depart from lex loci in airplane crash case); Hauch v. Connor,
453 A.2d 1207, 1209 (Md. App. 1983).
14 For example, Iowa recognizes a cause of action for a deceased tort victim's
pain and suffering, as well as wrongful death, and also permits the assessment of
punitive damages in both survival and wrongful death aspects of Iowa Code
§ 611.20. See Bernger v. Frink, 314 N.W.2d 388, 390 (Iowa 1982); Cardamon v.
Iowa Lutheran Hosp., 128 N.W.2d 226, 235 (Iowa 1964). In contrast, Colorado
does not permit damages for pain and suffering in survival actions. COLO. REV.
STAT. § 13-20-101 (1990). In Illinois, compensation in a wrongful death action
covers only pecuniary loss and not the decedent's pain and suffering. Thiele v.
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unfavorable to the airline, the airlines should look for ex-
ceptions that the state may recognize to the mechanical
application of the accident state's rules.' 5 Laws resulting
from the mechanical application of lexfori should be simi-
larly explored. 16 Because such qualifications would neces-
sarily be based upon the identification of other state's
policies, which the accident or forum state's law would
frustrate, the choice-of-law discussions below will aid in
such an attempt. If a plaintiff who benefits from the law of
either the state of the accident or the state of the forum
also resides in that state, however, it will be difficult in-
deed to escape the application of the accident or forum
state's law.
2. Jurisdictions Requiring Analysis of Interests
The existing and potential forums that do not apply lex
loci delicti or lexfori employ a variety of choice rules, which
depend upon some kind of inquiry into the interests of
the jurisdictions connected to the parties, the conduct,
and the accident.' 7 The most prevalent interest-analysis
test is the Restatement's "most significant relationship
Ortiz, 520 N.E.2d 881, 887 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988). Also, Illinois does not permit
punitive damages in either wrongful death or survival actions. Ballweg v. City of
Springfield, 499 N.E.2d 1373, 1377 (Il1. 1986); Froud v. Celotex Corp., 456
N.E.2d 131, 136-37 (Ill. 1983).
15 See generally Sweeney v. Sweeney, 262 N.W.2d 625, 628 (Mich. 1978) (declin-
ing to apply the law of Ohio, where the accident occurred, because Ohio's law
would have violated Michigan's public policy by holding the parent immune from
the child's suit for injuries suffered in an auto accident); Paul v. Nat'l Life, 352
S.E.2d 550 (W. Va. 1986) (refusing to apply the guest passenger statute of Indi-
ana, where the accident occurred).
16 Any case that speaks in terms of lexfori should be carefully examined for the
likelihood that the application of the forum's law is in reality the result of an inter-
est-analysis rather than an application of a state's designated choice rule, as such.
See, e.g., Sexton v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 320 N.W.2d 843 (Mich. 1982)(de-
cided by plurality). In this case, Justice Williams stated, "where Michigan resi-
dents or corporations doing business in Michigan are involved in accidents in
another state and appear as plaintiffs and defendants in Michigan courts, the
courts will apply the lexfori, not the lex loci delicti, and we do so without reference to
any particular state policy." Id. at 854; see also Olmstead v. Anderson, 400 N.W.2d
292, 299 (Mich. 1987).
17 For example, courts may employ the "most significant relationship" test,
some form of "governmental interest analysis," or "Leflar's factors."
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test.""8 This article attempts to provide a theoretical
background, which will not only serve as a general ap-
proach to many actual and potential choice problems, but
also illustrate ways in which reasoning already employed
in caselaw may be extended advantageously to completely
different choice issues. The discussion is couched in the
terms of the Restatement's "most significant relationship"
test, but its approach to the definition of interests will be
applicable to other interest tests as well.' 9 The attorney
must, of course, master those inflections that particular
jurisdictions have imposed upon the general formula.
E. RESTATEMENT GUIDELINES
Two of the Restatement's sections will guide any Re-
statement conflicts of law analysis: Sections 6 and 145.20
1. Section 6
Section 6 articulates general principles. 2' Section 6(1)
acknowledges potential constitutional concerns created
by a court's application of the statutory directive of its
18 RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 145.
'9 As the court said in Air Crash Chicago: "We emphasize at the outset that the
tests to be used, although containing significant differences, mandate an analytic
inquiry which is basically the same." Air Crash Chicago, 644 F.2d 594, 610 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 878 (1981).
20 RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, §§ 6, 145.
21 Restatement § 6 provides the following choice of law principles:
(1) A court, subject to constitutional restrictions, will follow a statu-
tory directive of its own state on choice of law.
(2) When there is no such directive, the factors relevant to the
choice of the applicable rule of law include
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the forum,
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the rel-
ative interests of those states in the determination of the par-
ticular issue,
(d) the protection of justified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and




own state on choice of law.22 Attorneys should watch for
such possibilities. For example, due process surely re-
quires at least some rationale for the forum state to per-
mit liability-derived either from the forum state's
specific interest in the accident itself, by way of a party's
residency, the center of relationship, or some activity con-
nected to the accident, or from the forum state's adoption
of a choice rule which at least acknowledges the legitimate
interests of other states." This concept might be useful
in regard to choice problems in which the laws of all the
most legitimately interested states would deny recovery,
but the plaintiff has filed suit in a lexfori state that permits
it. In such a case, it might be possible to argue that since
the forum state has little connection with the accident, the
application of its law would deprive the defending airline
of property without due process.
Counsel should be alert to use any of the section 6(2)
factors, but three of them will be particularly helpful. Sec-
tion 6(2)(c)'s principle of considering states' policies and
interests concerning the particular issue at hand (depe-
cage) will apply in every case.24 Reference to section
6(2)(f), which emphasizes the desirability of "certainty,
22 Id. § 6(1).
21 SeeJohn Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178 (1936); Home Ins.
Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930). These cases demonstrate that the United States
Constitution limits the power of a state that has no significant relationship to an
issue to characterize it as procedural in order to apply its own law. In Allstate Ins.
Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981), Justice Brennan stated that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Full Faith and Credit Clause of
Article IV, Section 1 require that in order for a state to apply its own law, it "must
have a significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts, creating state in-
terests, such that choice of law is neither arbitrary not fundamentally unfair." Id.
at 313. In Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 823 (1985), the Court
held unconstitutional the application of Kansas law in a class action where over
ninety-nine percent of the oil leases involved, and ninety-seven percent of the
plaintiffs, had no connection with Kansas.
If the defending airline has enough presence in the forum state to provide the
basis for jurisdiction, it will have to be argued that, unlike the case in which the
foreign plaintiff sues the airline in the state of its principal place of business or in
some other state connected with the accident itself, this minimum contact does
not itself vest the forum state with any legitimate interest in the problem at hand.
24 Air Crash Chicago, 644 F.2d at 610-12.
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predictability and uniformity of result, '25 and section
6(2)(g), which recommends "ease in the determination
and application of the law to be applied, ' 26 will help sup-
port logical choice arguments for which specific precedent
may be scarce. It should be remembered that section
6(2)'s "factors relevant to the choice of the applicable rule
of law' 27 are not intended to be all-inclusive.
2. Section 145
Section 145(1) provides that the rights and liabilities of
the parties to a tort issue "will be determined by the local
law of the state which, with respect to that issue, has the
most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties under
the principles stated in § 6." ' 28 Section 145(2) lists four con-
tacts that are "to be taken into account in applying the
principles of section 6 to determine the law applicable to
an issue" and that "are to be evaluated according to their
relative importance with respect to the particular issue.' ' 29 Like
the principles of section 6, these four contacts are not all-
inclusive. Three of them-the place of injury, the place of
conduct causing the injury, and the places connected to
the parties' residence and business-are fully integrated
into the discussion below. In air crash disasters, the
fourth contact, the center of the parties' relationship, can
probably be quickly dispatched. A note to Section 146,
entitled "Personal Injuries," creates a presumption in
favor of the law of the place of injury. Unless the place
25 RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 6(2)(f).
26 Id. § 6 (2)(g).
27 Id. § 6(2).
28 Id. § 145(1) (emphasis added).
29 Id. § 145(2) (emphasis added). The four contacts are as follows:
(a) the place where the injury occurred,
(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred,
(c) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and
place of business of the parties, and
(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is
centered.
30 See id. § 146. It states the following:
In an action for personal injury, the local law of the state where the
injury occurred determines the rights and liabilities of the parties,
CHOICE-OF-LA W PROBLEMS
of injury is connected to the flight in some specific way
other than as a merely fortuitous accident site, it should
be fairly easy to overcome this presumption in air crash
litigation. t
F. INAPPLICABILITY OF THE CENTER-OF-THE-PARTIES'
RELATIONSHIP TO AIR CRASH DISASTERS
In Air Crash Chicago the intended flight plan was from
Chicago to California. With respect to the Illinois dece-
dents who purchased their tickets in Illinois, the court
said that it was "unclear where the relationship of the par-
ties is 'centered.' ",32 The court continued to say that
"[s]urely the importance of the place of destination of a
journey is just as great as the importance of the place of
departure."5 3
It must be recognized that the Air Crash Chicago court's
discussion of the places of departure and destination as
the center of the parties' relationship may itself harbor a
fiction-what, for example, if a passenger at an American
Airlines counter in Idaho had booked passage on the
flight? In any case, the concept of the center of the par-
ties' relationship is inapplicable to air crashes. In the Air
Crash Chicago case, for example, it is difficult to imagine
how any relation between American Airlines and any pas-
senger could have been more clearly centered in Illinois
than that between American and the Illinois decedents
who resided in Illinois, purchased their tickets in Illinois,
unless, with respect to the particular issue, some other state has a
more significant relationship under the principles stated in § 6 to the
occurrence and the parties, in which event the local law of the other
state will be applied.
Id.
31 In Kaczmarek v. Allied Chem. Corp., 836 F.2d 1055 (7th Cir. 1987), the
court noted that under the brand of interest analysis employed by Illinois courts,
the presumption in favor of the place of the accident is easily overcome. Id. at
1057-58.
32 Air Crash Chicago, 644 F.2d 594, 612 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 878
(1981).
33 Id. The court then dismissed the issue because neither Illinois nor California
allow punitive damages in wrongful death claims. Id.
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began their flight in Illinois, and presumably would ulti-
mately return to Illinois. Yet the court in Air Crash Chicago
stated that it was unclear where the relationship of these
Illinois parties was centered. 4 Furthermore, the concept
of the center-of-relationship test demands more involve-
ment on the part of the center state than any state con-
nected with mass commercial transportation can have. 5
Finally, section 6(2)() and (g)'s interests in promoting
certainty, predictability, and uniformity of result, as well
as ease in the determination and application of the law to
be applied, would be ill-served by an attempt to conjure-
up a center of relationship in such a case. 6 Therefore,
section 145's mandate to evaluate the center of relation-
ship contact "according to [its] relative importance with
respect to the particular issue ' 37 requires that the center
of relationship must be discounted as a factor in regard to
tort claims generated by a commercial air crash.38
In any particular choice problem, the following analysis
will aid the evaluation of the significance of each of the
remaining three contacts of section 145(2).
G. Two BASIC INQUIRIES IN ALL CHOICE PROBLEMS
The development of a stance on all choice problems
arising in forums using interest tests necessitates the solu-
tions of two related problems. First, the governmental
and private interests expressed in the different jurisdic-
tions' laws on the particular subject at hand must be iden-
tified. Second, the rational evaluation and balancing of
any actual conflicts between these laws must be evaluated
and balanced.
34 Id.
55 Id. at 611-12.
6 Id. at 612 n.17.
37 RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 145(2).
38 Air Crash Chicago, 644 F.2d at 612 n.18.
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1. Identification of Interests: The Search for the Parties'
Legitimate Interests and the True Purposes of the
Conflicting Jurisdictions' Rules
The first inquiry necessitates the questions: 1) What is
the plaintiff's or the defendant's legitimate interest in the
matter? and 2) Does the jurisdiction's law fulfill that inter-
est? Care must be taken, however, to separate those in-
terests on the part of plaintiffs or defendants, which are
merely by-products of laws actually designed to accom-
plish other goals. The model for this crucial analysis is
the court's choice-of-law treatment of punitive damages in
wrongful death actions in Air Crash Chicago. Air Crash Chi-
cago established that even though plaintiffs certainly have
an interest in acquiring punitive damages awards, this in-
terest is merely a result of a state's real purposes in per-
mitting punitive damages: punishment and deterrence."9
Since, in order to qualify for punitive damages the plain-
tiffs must have already received compensation, their de-
sire for punitive damages is not an interest that is relevant
to the choice-of-law balancing process but is, instead, sim-
ply a gratuitous by-product of the state's desire to punish
and deter. The imaginative extension of this rationale to
other choice issues may reap considerable rewards. Put
simply, the defendant's goal of identifying parties' legiti-
mate interests and jurisdictions' true purposes is to isolate
and discard those rules benefitting plaintiffs that are not
legitimate or substantial for the purpose of choice-of-law
balancing. Air Crash Chicago established that a jurisdic-
tion's allowance of punitive damages is such a rule, but
the court's reasoning may be extended to other matters.40
For instance, consider those state rules refusing reduc-
tion to "present value" of an award for projected dam-
ages or denying the subtraction of projected income taxes
and self-support costs from awards for lost earnings and
loss of support to other family members. It may be diffi-
39 Id. at 613.
40 Id.
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cult to identify a rational basis for favoring a plaintiff with
an inflated recovery under such a rule. At the least, how-
ever, one can urge that if a plaintiff's interest in punitive
damages is not one cognizable in the choice-of-law bal-
ancing, the allowance of such windfall additions to a
plaintiff's full compensation should not be taken as equal
in weight to rules that protect defendants from such in-
flated recoveries.
Some laws may perhaps elude tidy identification with
one or the other of opposing interests. The mixed
messages of such rules must be taken into account in the
choice-of-law discussion.
2. Rational Balancing Of Diferent Jurisdictions' Interests
Choice-of-law rules other than simple lex loci delicti are
bound to require some sort of balancing.4' Whether the
forum's conflicts standard is the Restatement's "most sig-
nificant contacts," or "governmental interest," or some
variant of either of these, like California's "comparative
impairment," it will be necessary to evaluate the relative
importance of the interests of all the jurisdictions that are
concerned with the particular problem. The prelude to
this analysis is, of course, the identification of the actual
interests noted above in subsection 1. Once again, it
bears repeating that counsel must be careful to reveal and
discard any results that are merely by-products of rules
designed to serve other goals, for such by-products do
not exhibit a purpose strong enough to warrant consider-
ation in the choice-of-law balancing.
H. DOCTRINE OF DEPECAGE
At least in regard to the application of the Restate-
ment's most significant contacts test, an identification of a
jurisdiction's general interests in an air crash disaster
does not end the analysis of interests, which is required
for choice-of-law balancing. This is true because of the
41 Air Crash Chicago, 644 F.2d at 629-30.
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doctrine of depecage, which decrees that only those con-
tacts pertinent to the specific issue under discussion are
relevant to the determination of the law governing it.4 2
Under this doctrine, whether a state's interest is relevant
to the particular choice-of-law balancing concerning a
particular issue depends entirely upon the nature of the
state's interest and the state's motivation, or lack thereof,
to impose that policy under the circumstances at hand.4"
The Air Crash Chicago court's treatment of punitive dam-
ages in wrongful death cases provides a model for balanc-
ing different interests just as it did for evaluating the
plaintiff's and each separate jurisdiction's legitimate in-
terests.4 4 In Air Crash Chicago the court stated that those
plaintiffs' domiciles that do not allow punitive damages
do not have an interest in disallowing punitive damages
because the decision to disallow such damages is obvi-
ously designed to protect the interest of resident defend-
ants, not to effectuate the interest of the domiciliary states
in the welfare of plaintiffs. . . . Nor do the [plaintiffs']
domiciliary states have an interest in imposing punitive
damages on the defendants. The legitimate interests of these
states, after all, are limited to assuring that the plaintiffs are ade-
quately compensated for their injuries and that the proceeds of any
award are distributed to the appropriate beneficiaries."
In sum, forums applying any kind of governmental inter-
est test must begin with and be developed from an inquiry
into the specific purpose of the governmental policy ex-
hibited by each jurisdiction's particular rule.46
42 See id. at 610-11; RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, §§ 6(c), 145(1) & (2). Depecage
derives from the French word dfpecer, to cut up.
4 Air Crash Chicago, 644 F.2d at 610-11.
44 See id. at 594.
45 Id. at 612-13 (emphasis added).
46 See, e.g., the discussion of California's comparative impairment test. Id. at
621-28.
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III. A FRAMEWORK FOR APPLYING AND
EXTENDING THE REASONING OF AIR
CRASH CHICAGO TO OTHER
CHOICE PROBLEMS
A. THREE CATEGORIES OF GOVERNMENTAL INTEREST
In general, there are three categories of governmental
interest in air crash litigation:
1. Laws designed to influence conduct and their oppos-
ing corollaries and laws protecting the defendant from the
burdens of such conduct-influencing laws.47
Examples: Punitive damages as a deterrent to careless
behavior and the disallowance of punitive damages as a
protection of businesses within the particular jurisdiction.
2. Laws designed simply to allocate loss and not to influ-
ence conduct. These laws are of three basic types:
a) laws that put the risk of loss upon the defendant in
spite of its due care,
Example: Strict Liability without any qualifications that
take into consideration the defendant's conduct or other
practical concerns. Since, by definition, such a rule bene-
fits the plaintiff even though the defendant could not have
done anything to protect against the injury,48 it cannot be
considered a conduct-altering rule.
b) laws that, by defining who is entitled to compensa-
47 As it will be demonstrated in Section III below, the true equality for choice-
of-law purposes of rules having opposite results should not be taken for granted.
Instead, because the equality or lack of it should be measured by a comparison of
the significance of the policies underlying the opposing rules, it is important to
identify those issues in which opposite rules may not deserve equal weight in the
choice of law balancing. Examples of such imbalances will be discussed below.
48 See, e.g., Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hosp., 266 N.E.2d 897, 902-03
(Ill. 1970). The court in Cunningham held that the defendant's inability to discover
the hepatitis virus in the whole blood with which it transfused the plaintiff was not
a bar to the defendant's strict liability. Id. The subsequent legislative overturning
of Cunningham, of course, does not diminish the example of the case itself. See ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. I I §, para. 5102 (Smith-Hurd 1988). Many strict liability rules
are not so purely in favor of the plaintiff in their loss-allocation. See discussion
infra part III.B.2.a. Defense counsel must be careful to understand and use any
qualifications of pure strict liability which favor the defendant.
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tion, can increase or decrease a defendant's liability
and, correspondingly, deny or extend relief to a
class of injured parties,
Example: The allowance or disallowance of a parent's
right to loss of the society of a surviving minor child.49
c) laws that limit liability on some ground other than
the relationship of the would-be plaintiff to the
occurrence.
Example: Statutes of repose.
3. Laws establishing the elements of recovery after lia-
bility has been determined and the loss allocated.
Examples: Plaintiff's eligibility for prejudgment interest,
the deduction of projected income taxes, and self-support
from the defendant's liability in wrongful death cases.
The following is a general exploration of each cate-
gory's interests, which are relevant to choice-of-law bal-
ancing. By providing theoretical examples of the
advantageous extension of Air Crash Chicago's reasoning to
other choice of law problems, this exploration perhaps
will provide a point of reference for the treatment of par-
ticular issues that may arise.
B. IDENTIFICATION OF THE INTERESTS IN EACH OF THE
THREE CATEGORIES OF LAWS POTENTIALLY AT
ISSUE AND ASPECTS OF THEM WHICH
ARGUABLY FAVOR AN AIRLINE
1. Laws Designed to Influence Conduct or to Protect Businesses
from the Economic Burdens of Such Laws
In Air Crash Chicago the Seventh Circuit stated that the
legitimate interests of the plaintiffs' domiciliary states did
not extend beyond ensuring their plaintiffs' compensa-
tion.5 0 Therefore, the plaintiffs' states had no legitimate
49 See, e.g., Dralle v. Ruder, 529 N.E.2d 209, 212 (Ill. 1988) (refusing to recog-
nize a parental claim for loss of the society of a minor child who survived the
injuries).
- Air Crash Chicago, 644 F.2d 594, 612-13.
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interest either in benefitting their residents with punitive
damage awards or in imposing punitive damages upon
non-resident defendants. 5' The contacts of a defendant
that the Air Crash Chicago court deemed relevant to the
choice-of-law balancing of a conduct-influencing law were
the place of the defendant's misconduct and the principal
place of its business. 52
Air Crash Chicago also noted that while states permitting
punitive damages have an interest in deterrence of similar
conduct, states that do not permit punitive damages have
an interest in protecting defendants from "excessive fi-
nancial liability."'53 While the policies of these two rules
are expressed in different terms-conduct-influencing
and business-encouragement, respectively-they must
necessarily be considered equal in weight, because they
embody opposite solutions to the same issue. Each rule
must be deemed, under principles of comity, to embody
equally important policies. 4
51 Id.
52 Id. at 620-21. If, in addition to the Restatement's consideration of the place
of American's conduct causing the injury and its principal place of business, the
doing of business in a plaintiff's domiciliary state also conferred an interest upon
that state, the court might not have had to resort to the presumption in favor of
the law of the place of injury. Id.
5 Id. at 613.
In California, for example, punitive damages appear to be forbidden in
wrongful death claims, but permitted in survival actions. See, e.g., In re Paris Air
Crash, 622 F.2d 1315, 1317 n.2 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 976 (1980) (finding
that punitive damages were not permitted in wrongful death action); Tarasoff v.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 353 (Cal. 1976) (stating that recovery
of punitive damages was barred under wrongful death statutes); Georgie Boy
Mfg., Inc. v. Superior Court, 171 Cal. Rptr. 382, 385 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (ac-
knowledging that punitive damages were not permitted in wrongful death action).
When both kinds of actions are based upon the same tortious death, it is impossi-
ble to reconcile the different rules by reference only to the state's interest in influ-
encing or punishing behavior.
One can hardly interpret the difference as a reflection of different degrees of
interest in preventing the same death. Thus, California's different rules concern-
ing punitive damages in tortious death may be understood as expressing a judg-
ment that recovery by the deceased's estate, standing in the victim's shoes, is
warranted, but that the defendant should not be burdened with punitive damages
claims by persons other than the deceased.
Air Crash Chicago demonstrated the equality of rules permitting and forbidding
punitive damages when it ruled that Oklahoma's law permitting punitive damages
CHOICE-OF-LA W PROBLEMS
Not all opposing solutions to the same problem should
command equal weight in choice-of-law balancing. In
each choice-of-law problem, defense counsel must ascer-
tain whether an interest in the particular subject, which is
favorable to a defendant, is more securely based in ra-
tional policy than is the rule resulting in the opposite
result.55
2. Laws Designed Not to Influence Conduct But Only to
Allocate Loss
A defending airline may become involved with two
kinds of issues that invoke laws whose substance excludes
any connection to the defendant's conduct and whose en-
tire purpose is simply to allocate a loss that has undenia-
bly occurred. As the hypothetical examples below will
illustrate, the potential ramifications of such single pur-
posefulness may be helpful.
a. Strict Liability
Strict liability, liability based solely on the nature of the
product, can be viewed as expressing the single concern
of shifting the economic burden of the injury from the
privity-deprived plaintiff to the manufacturer who has in-
duced the sale and profited from it.56 In its purest state,
such liability is entirely divorced from considerations of
the manufacturer's conduct.5 7
and New York's law disallowing them were equally balanced: "[W]e conclude that
the place of conduct and the principal place of business each have strong interests
in having its law applied to the punitive damages question; we are unable to say
that one state's interest is greater than the other." Air Crash Chicago, 644 F.2d at
620-21.
.1 See infra part III.B.3.c. (discussing rules concerning the reduction of compen-
sation for future loss to present value).
5 See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 98
(5th ed. 1984).
57 Negligence considerations frequently dilute strict liability's concentration
upon pure loss-allocation. In Illinois, for example, a manufacturer may not be
held strictly liable for a design defect if a safer design is not feasible. Kerns v.
Engelke, 390 N.E.2d 859, 864 (11. 1979). Furthermore, a manufacturer may not
be held strictly liable in failure-to-warn cases unless it knew of the danger.
Woodill v. Parke Davis & Co., 402 N.E.2d 194, 198 (Ill. 1980).
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b. Limitations on Those Who May Recover
The defendant's liability is similarly divorced from con-
duct when the inclusion or exclusion from possible recov-
ery of a class of injured persons depends only upon
considerations of the nature of the class's injuries and of
how directly their causation flows from the actual tort.
For example, while few people would doubt that the non-
fatal injury of a minor child inflicts a terrible loss upon
parents, the Illinois Supreme Court has recently denied
parents a right to compensation for this loss.58 Wishing
to check an ever-widening scope of loss-of-society claims,
the court based its rejection upon 1) the difficulty of "dis-
tinguish[ing] between the child's claim, involving pain
and suffering, and the legally distinct but factually similar
claim by the parents for loss of the child's society and
companionship"59 and 2) the difficulty, if not impossibil-
ity, of quantifying the parents' loss in a satisfactory
manner. 60
c. Statutes of Repose
Statutes of repose plainly are not concerned with de-
fendants' conduct since such statutes do not change either
the standards by which defendants' conduct would be
measured for injuries occurring before the expiration of
the statutes' time or the degree of their potential liability.
Statutes of repose simply embody a legislative decision
that after a certain period of time, the risk of loss should
no longer fall upon the party originally responsible for
the product.
The choice-of-law ramifications for each of these sub-
categories could become very important to a defending
airline. Using the special characteristics of each problem
as a foundation, the following hypotheticals illustrate
searches for the true nature and relative gravity of oppos-




ing rules, which superficially may appear to be in irrecon-
cilable conflict.
d. Hypothetical Problems: Allocation of Loss Laws
Hypo 1: Defendant's state6 1 imposes a strict liability stan-
dard in design-defect cases which is more favorable to
plaintiffs than the strict liability rule of the plaintiff's own
state: an example of how to neutralize an apparently dam-
aging rule.
Let us assume that Colorado citizens allege a strict lia-
bility count against an airline based upon the airline's in-
volvement in the design of the accident aircraft. Let us
assume also that the aircraft's manufacture in California
could very likely implicate California's law on the basis
that the airline's involvement in the design phase oc-
curred at least in part in California. Furthermore, let us
assume that under California law the plaintiff's burden of
proof concerning strict liability in design is easier than it
would be concerning negligence in design62 and easier
than that required in the plaintiff's own state of residence.
If this were the case, application of California's rule would
appear to be potentially damaging to the airline. In real-
ity, however, Air Crash Chicago's reasoning could be ex-
tended to make a very strong case for dismissing such a
rule entirely from the choice-balancing concerning the
plaintiff's strict liability proof.
It could be argued that, absent a California plaintiff,
61 Although Air Crash Chicago demonstrates that a defendant corporation has at
least two connections which must be considered in "most significant interest" bal-
ancing: 1) its principal place of business and 2) the place of its conduct, in this
hypo, as well as hypos 2 and 4, the process of weighing interests is more simply
illustrated by the use of only one interest for each party.
62 When the design defectiveness of a product cannot be adequately measured
by consumer expectations, California provides an alternate measurement, which
enables the jury to consider, among other things, the gravity of the danger posed
by the design, the likelihood that such danger could occur, and the actual feasibil-
ity of a safer alternative design. See Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 455
(Cal. 1978). While this standard is explained as a retention of strict liability's fo-
cus on the product rather than a return to negligence principles, it is difficult to
deny that this standard reinstates negligence considerations.
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California has no interest in imposing strict liability for
defective design. The negative impact of such a rule upon
the defendant is not the result of a primary purpose like
the conduct-influencing goals expressed in normal negli-
gence rules or punitive damages. Rather, it is simply an
unavoidable result of pure strict liability's principal goal
of favoring injured plaintiffs. Since this rule is not
designed to control or influence resident defendants, it
can only be interpreted as expressing the policy of pro-
tecting resident plaintiffs. Supporting this argument is
the fact that California has no real interest in burdening
corporations doing substantial business in California with
losses suffered by non-California plaintiffs.63 If this is so,
California's strict liability law should not be relevant to
the choice-of-law balancing in a case concerning a Colo-
rado plaintiff.
Hypo 2: Defendant's state permits recovery by a particu-
lar class of plaintiffs.
If, like Illinois, the state of a defending airline's princi-
pal place of business forbids a parent's right of action for
the loss of society of a nonfatally injured minor child, that
state's interest in limiting the liability of defendants cen-
tering their business within its borders must, of course, be
considered a strong factor in the choice-of-law balancing
concerning the existence of this right of action. Following
Air Crash Chicago's reasoning, if the parent's state permits
this right of action, the two opposing rules may cancel
each other and yield choice-of-law dominance to the law
of the place of injury. 64
If, however, the state of the airline's principal place of
63 The Air Crash Chicago court put it this way:
California, place of MDC's conduct in manufacture and design of
the DC-IO, also has a strong interest in the issue of punitive dam-
ages. California ... has a substantial interest in the economic health
of corporations which do business within its borders. It derives sub-
stantial sales and income taxes, as well as other revenues, directly
and indirectly from a corporation's activities within the state.
Air Crash Chicago, 644 F.2d 594, 614 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 878 (1991).
6 See id. at 614-15.
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business or the state where the conduct occurred does
permit the parent's right of action, and if the parent in
question is a citizen of a different state which does not
permit the parent's action, it can be argued that the ad-
verse rule of the airline's state or states is not to be con-
sidered in the choice-of-law balancing. The reason is the
same as that in Hypo 1.
We have established that the rule permitting this right
of action has no purpose of affecting defendants in any
way other than as an indirect, by-product result of the
rule's actual goal of allocating the loss in favor of the
plaintiff. It follows that the parents to be favored by this
rule are resident parents and not non-resident parents
whose recovery under the rule would burden businesses
which the airline's state has a large interest in protecting.
Therefore, even though the rule of a state associated with
the defendant may seem to favor the plaintiff, a court
might be persuaded to eliminate any such defendant-
state's rule from the choice-of-law resolution and apply
the rule of the plaintiff-parent's state.
Hypo 3: The states of both the defendant's principal
place of business and of its misconduct have a strict liabil-
ity statute of repose, but the plaintiff's state of residence
has no such statute.
Here we have a direct conflict. The defendant's states
have determined that after a certain amount of time, strict
liability's imposition of loss upon a manufacturer is no
longer justified. 65 Such a cut-off expresses the desire to
spare a manufacturer the responsibility for all the prod-
ucts it ever produced and to shift some of that responsi-
bility to those who have more recently benefitted from the
continued use of the particular product. The plaintiff's
state, on the other hand, has determined that its strict lia-
bility loss-allocation is not to be qualified by any passage
65 Illinois, for example, has such a rule. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, para. 13-
213(b) (Smith-Hurd 1984).
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of time other than that of the applicable statute of
limitations.
If numbers were decisive in such situations, the interest
of the defendant's two states in limiting the time for strict
liability's loss allocation would of course prevail, and the
only remaining problem would be that of choosing which
state's statute of repose should govern. The Air Crash Chi-
cago case, however, demonstrates that choice-of-law puz-
zles are not "numbers games."' 66 So, let us assume that in
terms of their immediate result, the rules of the defend-
ant's states exactly balance the rule of the plaintiff's state.
If the purely superficial result-based test were accepted as
the whole story, then, under the Restatement's and Illi-
nois' rule, the court might defer to the presumption favor-
ing the law of the state of the accident. If that state has
not imposed a statute of repose upon its strict liability law,
such a deferral would be adverse to the airline. Accord-
ingly, the airline would wish to argue that a purely result-
based test is not sufficient and that the interests imple-
mented by statutes of repose merit greater consideration
than the interest in imposing upon manufacturers an
open-ended risk of strict liability exposure.
But even if the accident-state has adopted a statute of
repose concerning strict liability, it would be better for
two reasons if one could develop some reasonable justifi-
cation for asserting that a defendant's states' statutes of
repose deserve greater weight than the plaintiff's state's
unqualified imposition of strict liability. First, doing so
would provide airlines with a stronger argument than the
mere reliance on a presumption in favor of lex loci delicti.
Second, the rationale supporting the unequal balancing in
hypo 3 might help counsel to make at least a credible ar-
gument that a similarly unequal balance should exist in
favor of strict liability statutes of repose even if one of the
defendant's states also has not qualified its strict liability
provisions with such a statute.
66 See Air Crash Chicago, 644 F.2d at 613.
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The key to fashioning a solution is to stress the fact that
strict liability's imposition of responsibility in the absence
of the defendant's fault constitutes a radical departure
from the normal tort requirement of the breach of some
duty of care.67 The policy of imposing losses upon de-
fendants in spite of their exercise of due care indeed does
serve the legitimate purpose of imposing losses on the
manufacturer who is able to distribute the cost of injuries
among all the purchasers of the product.
Perhaps, however, there comes a time when continuing
a manufacturer's strict liability exposure for products long
ago distributed puts an unreasonable cumulative burden
both on the manufacturer and the present purchasers of
its products to whom the additional expense ultimately
will be passed. If, in general, plaintiffs had no possible
means of recovery other than strict liability, the interest
expressed by a plaintiff's state's refusal to impose a stat-
ute of repose upon strict liability would probably have to
be given weight equal to that of statutes of repose. In
such a case, this equality would be the only way to honor
the plaintiff's state's obvious interest in ensuring that its
residents have some cause of action for their injuries.
Frequently, however, plaintiffs sue both in negligence and
strict liability. In this case, it can be argued that the ad-
vantage the plaintiff gains in not having to prove a breach
of duty by the manufacturer is not equally important to
the manufacturer's state's interest in protecting its resi-
dent manufacturers against perpetual, and therefore end-
lessly cumulative, exposure for injuries caused by no fault
of the manufacturer.
67 Contaminated food was the product that first provoked what amounted to a
cause of action in tort not based upon the breach of some duty of care. The road
from this exception to modern strict liability law was slow and difficult. See ED-
WARD H. LEVI, INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING (1962).
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3. Laws That Do Not Influence Conduct or Allocate Risk But
Only Establish the Nature and Method of Recovery
After Liability Has Been Determined
a. Introduction
There are a number of potential issues in air crash cases
that do not invoke a given state's interest in influencing
conduct, but instead define compensation and how it is
going to be paid by the defendant. Three layers of con-
siderations may be discerned in regard to compensatory
damages. The first concerns the overall view of damages
and their constitution. This category concerns such issues
as state-imposed caps on certain classifications of dam-
ages" or prohibitions of particular elements of compen-
satory damages. 69 The section in this Article entitled
"Compensatory Damages"70 argues that regardless of the
effect on the defending airline, the law of each injured or
deceased passenger's domicile must control this aspect of
damages.
The second consideration is the proper measurement
of the damages permitted under the category above. For
example, in wrongful death cases, the question may be
whether or not the deceased's projected wages must be
reduced by the estimated amount he would have spent in
self-support and taxes.7'
The final consideration involves computational issues
which, taking into account prevalent economic realities,
determine how-or whether-the plaintiff receives the
sum that most accurately represents a complete yet not
excessive award. Examples of this category of concern are
- For example, Colorado caps wrongful death damages for noneconomic loss
or injury at $250,000. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 13-21-203 (West 1990).
69 For example, damages under Illinois' wrongful death statute are limited to
pecuniary injuries resulting from the victim's death, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, para. 2
(1989), and do not include the victim's pain and suffering. See Drews v. Gobel
Freight Lines, 578 N.E.2d 970, 973-74 (Ill. 1991).
1o See infra part V.
71 See, e.g., In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Ill. on May 25, 1979, 701 F.2d
1189, 1192-93 (7th Cir. 1983); In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Ill. on May
25, 1979, 803 F.2d 304, 312 (7th Cir. 1986).
CHOICE-OF-LA W PROBLEMS
rules requiring or forbidding the reduction of lost future
earnings to present value, and rules regarding the proper
calculation of prejudgment interest.
Although the choice-of-law concerning any of these
three layers of compensatory damage considerations fre-
quently has significant economic consequences,72 these
categories of consideration do not necessarily require uni-
form analysis for purposes of choice-of-law. For example,
although it is argued below73 that a defending airline
should accept the various plaintiffs' domiciliary states'
control of the basic award of damages whether or not they
are capped or limited in some way, there is no reason for
the airline to accept passively the redundant or inflated
burdens imposed by such rules as the refusal to reduce
future wages to present value or the refusal to permit the
reduction of future wages by estimations of the deceased's
future tax liability and self-support. Such rules, and their
more sensible opposites, are but alternate methods of car-
rying forward the jury's finding concerning the decedent's
projected gross earnings over a normal lifetime to the ful-
fillment of the applicable wrongful death act's purpose.
b. An "Erie Conundrum" - Substance v. Procedure
In In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Illinois on May 25,
1979 74 the Seventh Circuit ultimately escaped the neces-
sity of categorizing as substantive or procedural Illinois'
rule concerning the admission of evidence about the fu-
ture tax liability the deceased would have had to pay on
the wages his death prevented him from realizing.75 With
evident relief, the court stated:
Fortunately, we need not resolve this Erie conundrum in
this case, because we hold that Illinois' substantive mea-
72 For example, the difference between the liability for lost future earnings
which are not discounted to present value and such liability which is discounted
obviously can be very great.
73 See infra part IV.B.4.
74 701 F.2d 1189 (7th Cir. 1983).
75 Id. at 1195.
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sure of damages is identical to the FELA measure [permit-
ting evidence of future tax liability under the rule of
Norfolk & W Ry. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490 (1980)], leaving
the district court free to admit all evidence relevant to that
measure under Fed. R. Evid. 402.76
This finding saved the court from having to decide
whether Illinois's-and, indeed, the majority's-rule ex-
cluding evidence of future taxes is "procedural and there-
fore not binding on the federal courts under Erie" or
whether Illinois's "evidentiary rule" "defines what is
sought to be proved-here, the measure of damages-[so
that] it may bind the federal court under Erie princi-
ples."' 77 In support of the procedural nature of the ques-
tion, the court stated:
In adopting the rule that rejects evidence as being too
confusing, a state court may merely be making a statement
about its own competence and that of its juries to deal
with this kind of evidence. But a federal court may assess
its own capabilities differently, and logically should not be
bound by the state court's self-evaluation. Indeed, to the
extent that the exclusionary rule is based on fear of confu-
sion, it should not apply in federal court because Fed. R.
Evid. 403 provides a federal standard for rejecting rele-
vant evidence on the grounds of risk of prejudice, confu-
sion, or waste of time, and ... the Federal Rules generally
displace differing state rules even when the state rule is
"outcome-determinative." 78
In support of the substantive nature of the question, the
court set forth the following two considerations that "may
be so closely linked with the state's view of the measure of
damages (which is inseparable from the substantive right
of action,79 that it binds a federal court sitting in
diversity:" 80
76 Id.
17 Id. at 1193.
78 Id. at 1195.




1) [T]he calculation of net income is too speculative or
confusing because of tax rate fluctuations and the diffi-
culty of predicting exclusions and exemptions to which the
decedent would have been entitled[.]
2) [I]naccuracies resulting from the projection of gross
rather than net income are offset by the undercompensat-
ing effects of ignoring inflation of attorney's fees[. 8'
The fact that the difficulties of prediction and danger of
confusion appear as support for dubbing a rule excluding
projected tax liability both substantive and procedural
only serves to illustrate the confusion inherent in this par-
ticular incarnation of the substance/procedure puzzle.
Although it may be attractive for defense attorneys to call
State A's rule excluding evidence of prospective tax liabil-
ity "procedural" in order to attempt its admission under
Federal Rules of Evidence 402 and 403,82 defense attor-
neys may well ask whether the opposite rule is also proce-
dural. That is, is State B's requirement that tax liability be
considered merely a procedural recognition that its courts
and juries can deal with the speculative intricacies of pre-
diction? If it is, consistency with the airline's position in
regard to State A's rule would require that the airline pur-
sue not State B's definitive rule but Rule 403's more un-
certain balancing between probative value and the danger
of unfair prejudice. Thus, although attorneys must be on
the lookout for helpful applications of the substance/pro-
cedure dichotomy in regard to issues arising from the sec-
ond and third categories of considerations regarding
compensatory damages, they must also be aware of the
potential ramifications of such arguments as they may be
applied later in the litigation to similar issues raised by
different plaintiffs who invoke different state's rules. The
following examples of damage-computation issues will
perhaps help attorneys develop techniques for making the
most of choice-of-law problems concerning such issues.
8 Id. at 1193-94.
82 See id. at 1195.
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c. Hypothetical Problems: Reduction to Present Value
Hypo 4: Plaintiff's state requires reduction to present
value but defendant's state does not.
Hypo 4, a simplification of the situation which assumes
the second-to-the-worst line-up of interests in respect to
the defending airlines, will illustrate the kind of reasoning
which can be helpful.83
The rule requiring the reduction to present value of
awards for projected future damages is plainly motivated
by a desire to protect defendants from inflated liability.
Concerning plaintiffs, however, this rule is neutral in that
its goal is simply to make the injured person or her repre-
sentative economically whole. By the accrual of interest
earned on the discounted award the plaintiff can attain the
same economic benefit the injured person would have ac-
crued over the projected future time had the injuries not
occurred-but no more.84 It is not quite as easy to iden-
tify a logical rationale for a rule refusing deductions to
present value. While such a rule undoubtedly burdens
the defendant, it does so for no readily ascertainable pri-
mary purpose-it exists neither to influence conduct nor
to allocate primary liability.8 5
This analysis should be very useful in treating Hypo 4.
1- The worst line-up of interests would be that all the defending airline's states
as well as the plaintiff's state forbid reduction to present value. In such a case, the
airline will indeed have a problem!
In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Ill., on May 25, 1979, 644 F.2d 633,
643-46 (7th Cir. 1981), contains an instructive illustration of the principle in its
discussion of the difference between a reduction to cash value at the time of death
and at the time of trial.
8' In In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Ill., on May 25, 1979, 701 F.2d
1189 (7th Cir. 1983), the court listed the following among states' rationales for
the majority rule (at least at the time), which excluded evidence of a decedent's
would-be tax liability for the purpose of proving the amount of damages:
Unacceptable speculation and confusion in the calculation of net
income caused by tax rate fluctuations and difficulty of predicting
exemptions to which decedent would have been entitled;
Inaccuracies resulting from the projection of gross rather than net
income as an offset to the undercompensating effects of ignoring in-
flation and the plaintiff's payment of attorney's fees.
701 F.2d at 1193-94.
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Whatever may be the rationale for its rule, the defend-
ant's state has no interest in burdening its resident de-
fendant to the windfall advantage of a non-resident
plaintiff. For its part, the plaintiff's state perhaps has no
real interest in extending the benefit of its present-value
rule to a non-resident defendant. Thus, we are presented
with an apparent draw between two disinterested states.
Under the Restatement's rule,86 a true draw between in-
terests of states other than the place of the accident will
result in the application of accident state's law."7 It
should be argued, however, that in reality there is no
draw. The reason is that the plain logic and fairness of
the plaintiff's state's present-value rule deserves greater
weight than the illogical and unfair rule of the defendant's
state.88 Plaintiff's state's rule should therefore be applied,
particularly since the place of the accident has absolutely
no connection to the elements of recovery acquired by a
non-resident plaintiff against a non-resident defendant.
Because this result makes basic sense, it satisfies the Re-
statement's mandate that among the factors to be consid-
ered in the choice of law are "certainty, predictability and
uniformity of result, and... ease in the determination and
application of the law to be applied."8 9
86 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 914A (1977).
87 Id.
88 In regard to wrongful death suits, comment c to the Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 914A, entitled "Effect of Taxation," states:
In the majority of states, the recovery of the statutory beneficiaries is
measured by the contributions that the deceased would have made
to them if he had lived .... This amount obviously could not be
equivalent to his gross earnings, as he could not have given them
funds that he spent on himself or paid in taxes or used for other
purposes; and an appropriate percentage of his expected earnings,
taking into consideration these various types of expenditures, is
proper.
Id. cmt. c.; see In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Ill., on May 25, 1979, 803
F.2d 304, 311 (7th Cir. 1986).
89 RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 6(f)-(g); see Air Crash Chicago, 644 F.2d at 616
(emphasizing these Restatement factors).
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Hypo 5: Plaintiff's state and the state of defendant's prin-
cipal place of business require reduction to present value,
but the state of defendant's misconduct does not.
Since in the case of defendant-corporations, the Re-
statement's test, at least, requires consideration of the in-
terests of the principal place of the corporation's business
as well as the place of its misconduct, the reasoning of
Hypo 4 would have to be extended to include a discussion
of the interests of both these states. If the states of the
airline's principal place of business as well as of its mis-
conduct both employ present value, of course there would
be no conflict between the plaintiff's state and the air-
line's states. If, however, the place of the airline's miscon-
duct refused the present-value reduction, it should be
argued that 1) the misconduct-state's interest is not one
having to do with conduct and 2) the misconduct-state is
not interested in burdening a defendant within its borders
with a windfall to a non-resident plaintiff. Accordingly, on
the issue of reduction to present value, the interest to be
considered in relation to the defendant is that of its prin-
cipal place of business which has expressed a rule favor-
ing all businesses within its borders above all injured
parties.
Hypo 6: Plaintiff's state and the state of defendant's mis-
conduct do not permit present-value reduction but the
state of defendant's principal place of business requires it.
The difference between this hypo and the one above is
that whatever may be its rationale, the rule of the plain-
tiff's state favors its plaintiffs with the windfall recovery
inherent in the denial of the discounting to present value.
Such a case presents a more difficult argument for defense
counsel. The foundation for the airline's position must be
a demonstration of the lack of interest of the misconduct
state under the present circumstances. The defending
airline's argument should be that a state can have no legit-
imate interest in penalizing a defendant by imposing on it
the burden of giving a windfall to the plaintiff. Therefore,
the only interest discernable in such a state's rule is one
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that favors plaintiffs. But this interest, it can be argued,
does not go so far as to burden a defendant, whose busi-
ness the state wishes to encourage within its borders, with
a windfall to non-resident plaintiffs with whom the state
has no connection at all.90 This reasoning eliminates the
state of the defendant's misconduct and leaves remaining
the same two opposing but unevenly weighted rules dis-
cussed in Hypo 4 above.
The kind of analysis sketched here can be applied to
different line-ups of rules requiring or forbidding reduc-
tion to present value. Similar approaches can be taken to
the problem of allowance/disallowance of a decedent's
projected income taxes and projected costs of normal
self-support.9'
d. Three Categories of Hypotheticals Concerning
Prejudgment Interest
In air crash litigation, an airline may be confronted with
choice problems concerned with three categories of pre-
judgment interest issues:
1. The assertion of some states' laws permitting prejudg-
ment interest on personal injury and wrongful death
awards;
2. The assertion of prejudgment interest on any prop-
erty damages awarded;
3. The assertion of prejudgment interest on the recovery
of contribution toward the past payment of personal in-
jury and wrongful death awards.92
e. Two Prerequisites for the Logical Assessment of
Prejudgment Interest
The frame of reference for dealing with any prejudg-
ment-interest choice of law problem consists of the identi-
90 Air Crash Chicago, 644 F.2d at 614.
91 See supra text accompanying note 81.
92 For a review of particular states' rules concerning prejudgment interest, see
James D. Wilson, et al., Prejudgment Interest in Personal Injury, Wrongful Death and
Other Actions, 1986 TRIAL LAW. GUIDE 105 (1986).
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fication of the economic components of complete
recovery under the particular circumstances. In purely
logical terms, the assessment of prejudgment interest re-
quires the establishment of two prerequisites.
1. The passage of time must be a separate component of the
damages necessary to compensate the plaintiffully.
The first condition to a logical prejudgment interest
rule is the demonstration of the necessity of including the
passage of time as a separately calculated component fac-
tor that is indispensable to the complete compensation
for the loss. When one is deprived of some object of
value (e.g., an airplane, house) or some medium of ex-
change symbolizing an interest in objects of value or the
power to acquire them (e.g., stock certificates, bonds,
money), she suffers not only the primary, basic loss of the
item itself - its replacement value as measured at the
time of loss - but also the loss of the income or accumu-
lation of value accruing from the use, investment, or even
mere preservation of the item. This kind of time-incurred
loss that is added to an identifiable and separate primary
loss is completely different from time-based losses which,
like permanent disablement, form an inseparable element
of the primary loss itself.
2. The time period defining the loss properly addressed by
prejudgment interest must be limited to that between the
occurrence of the loss and the judgment.
The second condition is that the economic loss which
prejudgment interest recompenses properly can be only
that suffered by the plaintiff or her representative for the
period between the loss and the judgement. More than
just the name, prejudgment interest, compels this conclu-
sion. The other two periods during which a plaintiff can
accrue interest are otherwise accounted for: post-judg-
ment interest takes care of the time between judgment
and satisfaction; and after the payment of the judgment,
the plaintiff himself becomes responsible for the accrual
[58
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of interest. 93 This principle may be generally stated as:
No prejudgment interest should be allowed to accrue on
any part of the loss which is not attributable to the time
period between the occurrence generating the aggregate
loss and the judgment.
f. Two Threshold Questions About Damages Necessary
to a Prejudgment Interest Analysis
Many states violate the fundamental logic of these two
conditions in a variety of ways. But regardless of the par-
ticular rules involved in any given prejudgment-interest
choice problem, the defending airline's solution should
begin with two questions:
1. Does the damage-computation necessitated by the
particular cause of action at issue (for example, lost
wages in wrongful death or loss of society) in-
clude-either implicitly or explicitly-the passage
of time? Perhaps it will help to frame the question
as: At the time of the occurrence, was the loss at
issue one which is to be measured by reference only
to the moment immediately after the occurrence
and without any measurement of loss accruing
either between the occurrence and the judgment or
of the future beyond the judgment?9 4 If the answer
to this question is "Yes," it will sometimes be diffi-
cult to make a rational argument against the neces-
sity of prejudgment interest for the plaintiff's total
compensation.
2. If, however, the damages do include some passage
of time, the attorney must identify the period or pe-
riods of time included. For example, recovery of
lost future wages in a wrongful death case actually
93 It is the plaintiff's ability to make this interest which prompts some jurisdic-
tions to require a reduction ofa decedent's projected lost future earning's to pres-
ent value.
94 For example, if an auto is demolished in a collision, the damage to the prop-
erty itself which the owner suffers is measured solely by comparing the car's value
before and after the accident.
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includes calculations of both the wages lost be-
tween the accident and the judgment, and the post-
judgment wages which the fact finder estimates
from projections of the decedent's life expectancy
and career opportunities.
While logic dictates that prejudgment interest should
accrue on those wages the decedent would have earned
before the judgment, 95 it should not accrue on those pro-
jected after the judgment. The reason is that during the
period between the accident and the judgment, the dece-
dent himself could not have accrued any interest on the
wages he would have earned after that time. Plainly,
granting such a windfall to the decedent's heirs imposes
a burden upon the defendant which exceeds full
compensation .96
The following sets of hypotheticals will illustrate ap-
proaches to each category of prejudgment interest prob-
lem. Although the rule of a state like Illinois, which does
not allow prejudgment interest, may be favorable to de-
fendants in some respects, it must be recognized that
under the kind of interest-analysis prescribed above, the
disallowance of prejudgment interest can be illogical and
unfair in regard to a defendant in at least two respects:
1) in cases of property losses the defendant suffered at the
time of the accident, and 2) in cases of claim payments the
defendant may have made before acquiring the right of
contribution from another defendant.
95 Ideally, of course, this prejudgment interest should accrue only incre-
mentally at the rate the decedent would have realized the wages. See Moore-Mc-
Cormack Lines v. Richardson, 295 F.2d 583, 595 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 989 (1962). Moreover, the prejudgment interest should not be figured on
gross wages but upon the amount the decedent herself would have had at her
disposal after the deduction of taxes and her own support.
91 For elaboration of this point, see In re Pago Pago Aircrash of Jan. 30, 1974,
525 F. Supp. 1007, 1016 (C.D. Cal. 1981), in which the court noted that prejudg-
ment interest on the present-value award compensating for the lost wages accruing
after the trial is not necessary to put the plaintiff in the position he would have been
had he been made whole at the time of his injury.
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g. Category 1: Prejudgment Interest on Personal
Injury and Death Awards
In wrongful death and survival actions as well as per-
sonal injury actions, it will be important for defending air-
lines to avoid the application of rules which permit
interest on compensatory damages to run from the date of
death or injury. 97 The ensuing discussion shows the in-
herent redundancies possible in prejudgment interest as-
sessments in such cases. The sensible solution is to
prohibit these redundancies and permit prejudgment in-
terest only when the compensatory damages awarded do
not themselves compensate for the loss of the financial re-
wards that the passage of time/accrual of value would
have bestowed upon the injured party had the injury not
occurred.
Hypo 7: One of the airline defendant's states allows no
prejudgment interest in personal injury or wrongful death
cases,9 but the other gives the jury the discretion to as-
sess it both for wrongful death and personal injury;99
97 Iowa, for example, permits such interest in wrongful death, but appears to
deny prejudgment interest in personal injury cases. In Wetz v. Thorpe, 215
N.W.2d 350, 357-58 (Iowa 1974), the court acknowledged the general rule that
unliquidated damages do not support interest until judgment. Id. at 357. The
court noted the exceptions to this rule when the damages are complete at a given
time, and stated, "[clertainly the injury and resulting damage in this case were
complete and the obligation of the defendants to pay was perfect at the instant of
death and an allowance of interest from the date of death is essential to the ac-
complishment of full justice." Id. at 358.
98 In Illinois, "the general rule is that prejudgment interest cannot be awarded
unless provided by statute or agreement of the parties." Air Crash Near Chicago,
Ill., 644 F.2d 633, 638 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 454 U.S. 878 (1981). In addition,
prejudgment interest is not available in wrongful death or personal injury cases.
Robles v. Chicago Transit Auth., 601 N.E.2d 869, 882-83 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992);
Northern Trust Co. v. County of Cook, 481 N.E.2d 957, 962 (IlI. App. Ct. 1985).
California, for example, permits prejudgment interest as follows:
(a) Every person who is entitled to recover damages certain, or ca-
pable of being made certain by calculation, and the right to recover
which is vested in him upon a particular day, is entitled also to re-
cover interest thereon from that day, except during such time as the
debtor is prevented by law, or by the act of the creditor from paying
the debt. This section is applicable to recovery of damages and in-
terest from any such debtor ....
(b) Every person who is entitled under any judgment to receive
damages based upon a cause of action in contract where the claim
948 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE
plaintiff's state permits prejudgment interest for personal
injury and wrongful death awards.
Here, there are two steps to the balancing test. The
first is between the two states associated with the defend-
ant and the second between the dominant defendant-as-
sociated interest and the plaintiff's state's interest.
Step 1
The attorney must first deal with the conflict between
the defendant's states. One of the defendant's states ex-
presses a flat interest in protecting defendants against
prejudgment interest. Imagine, however, that the defend-
ant's other state grants the jury the discretion to levy pre-
judgment interest without making any exception for
instances in which the basic award's inclusion of the pas-
sage of time as an element of damages makes the addition
of prejudgment interest redundant. Defense counsel
must develop an argument showing why the former state's
rule is entitled to greater weight than the latter state's
rule.
The groundwork for this argument lies in the identifica-
tion of those rules that inflict upon the defendant an unfa-
vorable redundancy of recovery to the plaintiff. But
beware! The assertion of a redundancy of recovery which
prejudgment interest would impose must not violate pre-
viously established the basic principles. The credibility
and persuasiveness of the defending airline's arguments
will depend upon a precise identification of the nature of
any redundancies of recovery which the granting of pre-
was unliquidated, may also recover interest thereon from a date
prior to the entry ofjudgment as the court may in its discretion, fix,
but in no event earlier than the date the action was filed.
CAL. CIv. CODE § 3287 (West 1970).
In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from con-
tract, and in every case of oppression, fraud, or malice, interest may
be given, in the discretion of the jury.
CAL. CIv. CODE § 3288 (West 1970).
It appears that Section 3288 gives the jury the discretion to assess prejudgment
interest on personal injury awards. Id.
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judgment interest would impose on the defendant. Two
examples will illustrate this point.
EXAMPLE (A): An award for the decedent's pain and
suffering constitutes a monetary measurement of the na-
ture and duration of the decedent's suffering. In a sense,
such a measurement may look similar to the measurement
of property loss which logically supports prejudgment in-
terest. Unlike the gradual projected accrual that defines
the aggregate loss of future wages, no future projections
of loss are possible in such a case. Instead, the entire loss
has accrued upon the decedent's death before the judg-
ment. These realities might seem to suggest prejudgment
interest.
One can argue, however, that there is an essential differ-
ence between the measurement of damages for pain and
suffering, and those for property damage. Property dam-
ages are measured by reference to values at the time of the
loss. Damages for pain and suffering have no such point
of reference, but rather, are measured according to the
fact-finder's present perceptions of the deceased person's
pain and suffering which may have occurred several years
earlier and perhaps in a climate of lesser jury awards.' 00
The obvious unavailability of any objective measurement
of the damages themselves injects an element of instability
into the issue which airline defendants can perhaps argue
to their advantage.
Counsel can assert that, even if the plaintiff's state may
have a right to impose prejudgment interest for pain and
suffering upon a defendant which has strong ties to the
state, the weighing changes when the defendant's ties are
not so strong. In such a case, a plaintiff's state's rule per-
mitting prejudgment interest to be superimposed upon an
already purely subjective compensatory award does not
deserve equal consideration with the defendant's state's
rule protecting resident defendants from prejudgment in-
terest, which under the circumstances, inflicts a high
chance of redundancy in recovery.
oo Perhaps in a given jurisdiction it might be possible to develop statistics
showing increases in particular categories ofjury awards; if so, it might be argued
that a jury's evaluation of pain and suffering already includes compensation for
the passage of time.
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EXAMPLE (B): A reward for a decedent's lost earnings
plainly includes compensation the decedent would have
earned after the date of the judgment. Permitting pre-
judgment interest on that part of the lost earning award
that projects the wages plaintiff would have earned after
the judgment plainly imposes a surcharge on the compen-
sation which the fact-finder has determined to be due from
the defendant. The argument here is the same as that in
Example (A) above: defendant's state has a more legiti-
mate interest in protecting its resident businesses from
such unfair burdens than does the plaintiff's state in giv-
ing a windfall to the plaintiff.'"' After the identification of
the exact nature of the redundant recovery resulting from
an assessment of prejudgment interest, counsel may pro-
ceed to argue that one airline-related state's protection of
defendants from hidden redundancies in recovery should
outweigh the discretionary allowance of such redundan-
cies which another state related to the airline permits.
It must be argued that although a jury's discretionary
assessment of prejudgment interest is perfectly consistent
with the basic compensatory principles in a property dam-
age case in which the amount of compensatory damages is
hotly contested, a similar assessment in Examples (A) and
(B) above would certainly violate these principles. Indeed,
in Examples (A) and (B) it is possible to discern only one
real policy motive which the discretionary-interest state
could have for permitting the assessment of prejudgment
interest: the desire to benefit plaintiffs. As previously
demonstrated, when the plaintiff is not a resident of a dis-
cretionary-interest state, a cogent argument can be made
that a defendant's state's discretionary-interest rule
should have little force when the airline is a corporation
which brings substantial taxes and other revenues to it.
Therefore, because of its legitimate desire to protect resi-
dent corporations from unfair and duplicative damages
10, The court in In re Pago Pago Aircrash of January 30, 1974, 525 F. Supp.
1007, 1015-16 (C.D. Cal. 1981) noted the tendency of prejudgment interest abil-
ity to provide a double recovery in certain instances. Id. at 1015-16. The court
pointed out that the reduction to present value of lost future earnings at the time
of trial in 1978, less the amount that the reduction to present value would have
been at the time of injury in 1974, approximates the interest the plaintiff would
have earned on the post-1978 amount between 1974 and 1978. Id. at 1016.
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awards, the interest of the airline-related state in forbid-
ding prejudgment interest should be chosen to represent
the defendant.
Step 2
The second step requires demonstrating that the air-
line-state's interest in protecting its resident defendants is
entitled to greater weight than the plaintiff's state's au-
thorization of prejudgment interest. This must be done
by exposing the plaintiff's state's lack of legitimate inter-
est in awarding the plaintiff prejudgment interest which
pays her twice for the passage of time. Whatever the
plaintiff's state's interest might be in giving plaintiff this
windfall, it cannot be as important as an airline-state's in-
terest in protecting its resident defendants from such
excess.
h. Category 2: The Airline's Claims for Prejudgment
Interest on Property Damage to Its Aircraft
The logic of permitting an airline, as a plaintiff, to re-
cover prejudgment interest for the loss of its aircraft is
very strong. The airline, however, must neutralize its reli-
ance upon any rule against prejudgment interest which it
might have urged in regard to pain and suffering and lost
wages awards. The airline attorney, having sought an ad-
vantage from the rule against prejudgment interest in
such cases, must be prepared to deal with the irrationality
of a rule which does not permit prejudgment interest,
even when it is necessary to complete a plaintiff's com-
pensation. This task should not be difficult. The Restate-
ment's factors are designed to achieve sensible results,
not to promote a foolish consistency. Furthermore, the
doctrine of depecage requires the separate treatment of
each particular issue. Thus, there is no inconsistency in
arguing for a rule against prejudgment interest either
when the basic compensatory award already includes pay-
ment for the passage of time or when the basic award is
for damages which accrue after the judgment, yet arguing
19931 951
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against it when it would prevent complete compensation.
This argument demonstrates that the airline-related state
which permits prejudgment interest has a substantial in-
terest in protecting a business which brings it significant
revenue. Similarly, the airline-related state which does
not permit prejudgment interest would seem to have no
interest in applying a rule designed to protect its resident
defendants in a way which penalizes the airline for choos-
ing to do business there.
From this point, the logic of the argument is clear. To
the extent that states connected with the airline's adver-
sary permit prejudgment interest, they provide no obsta-
cle to the choice of the law described above. To the
extent they obstruct the assessment of prejudgment inter-
est on the airline's property damage, it must be argued
that their unfairness subordinates them to the more rea-
sonable rule of the airline's state permitting prejudgment
interest.
i. Category 3: Prejudgment Interest on Contributions
Made to the Airline for Personal Injury
Settlements Previously Paid by the Airline
Let us assume that in addition to those airline-related
states hypothesized above, the co-defendant against which
the airline ultimately will claim contribution for settle-
ments is connected to jurisdictions which forbid prejudg-
ment interest on such contributions.
In terms of economic logic, the airline's payment of an
entire personal injury or wrongful death claim mandates
the payment of prejudgment interest by any co-defendant
who later becomes liable for the contribution of its part of
those damages. Between the time of the airline's payment
of the claim and the judgment, the airline has plainly lost
interest on the amount. it paid on behalf of the other de-
fendant, and the co-defendant's contribution payment for
its percentage of fault itself does not include the reim-
bursement of such interest. If the co-defendant's state
permits prejudgment interest, nothing need be added to
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the discussion above. If the co-defendant's state forbids
prejudgment interest, the argument above for choosing
the airline-related state, which permits prejudgment inter-
est over that which does not, applies equally to similar
conflicts with a co-defendant's state.
IV. PUNITIVE DAMAGES
A. INTRODUCTION
Like other potential choice of law problems already dis-
cussed, our model for choosing the law applicable to pu-
nitive damages claims is the Air Crash Chicago case.
Ironically, the emphasis that Air Crash Chicago gives to the
consideration of the deterrent effect of state-imposed pu-
nitive damages does not comport with reality. Specifi-
cally, the standards which shape the conduct of aircraft
manufacturers and commercial carriers are the govern-
mental regulations of the United States and those coun-
tries who purchase aircraft or entertain their travel within
their borders, as well as higher standards imposed by the
industry or by the manufacturer or carrier itself. Unfortu-
nately, however, regardless of the merits of a simpler rule,
for practical purposes, defending airlines will probably be
confined to the kind of reasoning found in Air Crash
Chicago. 102
B. AIR CRASH CHICAGO
The Air Crash Chicago case is helpful in regard to puni-
102 The lack of state regulation of such matters confirms the exclusive focus
upon these less parochial rules. Since this is the case, whatever added deterrence
punitive damages can provide toward the fulfillment of these standards surely
should be based on such standards and thus be uniform throughout the country.
Acceptance of this reality leaves to the states no legitimate interest in applying
local tort standards of conduct. Since Air Crash Chicago declares that jurisdictions
have no legitimate interest in plaintiffs' receiving punitive damages, and since the
individual states' rules on punitive damages are not in fact realistic mediums of
influencing conduct, there would seem to be no legitimate interest in states' ap-
plying their own punitive damages law. Unfortunately, in regard to air crash di-
sasters at least, the game of conflicts continues to be played by patently arbitrary
rules. Air Crash Chicago, 644 F.2d at 632-33 (Sprecher, J., commenting on the
choice of law applicable to punitive damages).
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tive damages claims based upon wrongful death actions in
particular and to punitive damages claims in general.1 0 3
The appeal in Air Crash Chicago concerned the validity of
the trial court's disposal of McDonnell Douglas Corpora-
tion's (MDC) and American Airlines' (American) motion
to strike claims for punitive damages arising from the
plaintiffs' wrongful death claims. Because all cases had
been transferred to the Northern District of Illinois for
pretrial purposes by order of the Judicial Panel on Mul-
tidistrict Litigation, both the trial court and the appellate
court had to begin their choice analyses by identifying the
choice rules of the transferror states: Illinois, California,
New York, Michigan, Puerto Rico and Hawaii.
C. AIR CRASH CHICAGO'S DISCUSSION OF Two
IMPORTANT CHOICE RULES
Among the choice rules which the Air Crash Chicago case
discusses, two provide the most instructive illustrations of
choice analysis: the rules of Illinois and California.' °4
The Air Crash Chicago court's explanations of these states'
choice of law rules governing punitive damages in wrong-
ful death cases may be summarized as follows:
1. Illinois' Test
Illinois has adopted the Restatement's "most significant
relationship" test, as embodied generally in sections 6
and 145,105 and sections 175 and 178, which states that
10S The fact that the context of the Air Crash Chicago court's punitive damages
discussion was wrongful death does not diminish the application of its reasoning
to punitive damages claimed in other causes of action.
104 The Air Crash Chicago court also applied New York's test, which it said "is the
functional equivalent of the Restatement (Second) test, the Illinois test" and those
of Michigan, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico. Air Crash Chicago, 644 F.2d at 629. In In re
Air Crash Disaster at Sioux City, Iowa, 734 F. Supp. 1425 (N.D. Il1. 1990), the
court discussed in detail the application of both California's and Illinois' choice of
law rules and stated: "Since California's governmental interest analysis and the
Restatement test [of Illinois] produced the same result for each defendant, it is
unnecessary to repeat the analysis with regard to the combined interest tests em-
ployed by Pennsylvania and the District of Columbia." Id. at 1437.
05 See supra notes 20, 24, 27 and accompanying text.
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damages for wrongful death will be governed by "the lo-
cal law of the state where the injury occurred ... unless,
with respect to the particular issue, some other state has a
more significant relationship under the principles stated
in Section 6 to the occurrence and the parties, in which
event the local law of the other state will be applied."' 10 6
2. California's Test
California applies the "comparative impairment" analy-
sis to choice of law questions. The first step is to identify
the states which have interests relevant to the precise is-
sue. In Air Crash Chicago these states were: the defendants'
principal places of business, the places of their alleged
misconduct and the place of the accident. l0 7
The second step is to examine the interested states'
laws on the particular issue to determine what conflicts
exist. Apparent conflicts may be resolved if it can be
demonstrated that "a 'moderate and restrained interpre-
tation' of both the policy and the circumstances reveals
that only one state has a legitimate interest in the applica-
tion of its policy."' 0 8
If there are actual conflicts, California requires the
court
to determine the relative commitment by each interested
state to the law involved. This examination of the relative
commitment examines two factors: (1) the current status
of a statute and the intensity of interest with which it is
held; and (2) the "comparative pertinence" of the statute:
the "fit" between the purpose of the legislature and the
situation in the case at hand.' 0 9
1-6 Air Crash Chicago, 644 F.2d at 611-12 nn.16-18; RESTATEMENT, supra note 6,
§§ 6, 145, 175, 178.
107 Air Crash Chicago, 644 F.2d at 622.
108 Id. at 621 (quoting Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 546 P.2d 719, 723 (Cal.
1976)).
-09 Id. at 622 (footnotes omitted) (citing Offshore Rental Co. v. Continental Oil
Co., 583 P.2d 721, 726-27 (Cal. 1978)).
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D. AVOIDING A DEFAULT TO THE LAW OF THE PLACE OF
THE ACCIDENT WHEN THE AIRLINE'S PLACE OF
MISCONDUCT AND PRINCIPAL PLACE OF
BUSINESS HAVE OPPOSING
PUNITIVE DAMAGES RULES
In some cases, the airline attorney will wish to avoid the
Air Crash Chicago case's deferral by default to the accident
state's law. The attempt must challenge the validity of the
stalemate upon which the court relied.
1. The Problem
In weighing the interests of MDC's principal place of
business, Missouri, and the place of MDC's alleged mis-
conduct, California, the Air Crash Chicago court deter-
mined that Missouri's goal of allowing punitive damages
in wrongful death cases was equal to California's interest
in protecting against imposing punitive damages in
wrongful death cases. 1 0 The court also found that Mis-
souri's theoretical ability to accomplish its goals by crimi-
nal prosecution of MDC was equally balanced with the
fact that California's policy of financial protection theoret-
ically could be achieved through insuring against punitive
damages, a practice permitted in California."'I Because it
deemed Missouri's and California's conflicting interests to
be equal, the court applied the law of Illinois, the place of
injury. It is likely that a compelling argument from a de-
fending airline would be necessary to prevent a court's
application of a similar default rule under the Restate-
ment's "most significant relationship" test.
The interests which must be addressed are: 1) the place
of an airline's alleged misconduct permits punitive dam-
ages; 2) the airline's principal place of business forbids
them; and 3) the place of the accident permits them.
Under Air Crash Chicago, the two airline-related states' op-
posing rules cancel each other out and prompt a default
1o Id. at 615.
11 Id. at 614-15.
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to the unfavorable law of the accident state. This undesir-
able result might be avoided.
2. A Solution
The Air Crash Chicago case concerned motions to dismiss
the punitive damage claims because of their insufficiency
as a matter of law. At that stage, there presumably were
no facts before the court to indicate why either airline-
related state might have a dominant interest in the matter.
However, if it could be shown that the alleged misconduct
consisted of the accurate fulfillment of policies formulated
by the airline's principal office, a strong argument could
be made that because the principal place of business was
host to the conduct generating the alleged injury, it has a
greater interest in the matter than does the misconduct-
state, where the policy decision was merely
implemented." 12
The court in In re Air Crash Disaster at Sioux City, Iowa "l
achieved a similar result concerning United Airlines by:
1) stating that it was more likely that injury would occur in
United's hub in Illinois than in California or Colorado,
the states where misconduct in regard to maintenance or
training might have occurred and 2) recharacterizing alle-
gations concerning United's wrongful conduct as "per-
mitting passengers to travel upon a faulty aircraft flown by
an ill-trained crew."' 4 The court's solution provides a
striking illustration of the fact that, in regard to large, na-
tional corporations, there is no single acceptable defini-
tion of concepts like "misconduct."
112 This argument, of course, harbors its own fiction. In all likelihood, the air-
line officials making the decisions are much less concerned with the host state's
rule on this matter than they are, for example, in instructing their local personnel
about the host state's health codes.
11 734 F. Supp. 1425 (N.D. Ill. 1990) [hereinafter Air Crash Sioux City].
114 Id. at 1432-33, 1435-36.
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E. FACTORS TO CONSIDER IN NEUTRALIZING AN
UNFAVORABLE PUNITIVE-DAMAGES RULE OF THE
ACCIDENT STATE
Plainly, it will frequently be to a defending airline's ad-
vantage to minimize the accident state's interest in puni-
tive damages. For example, assume that the states of both
the airline's alleged misconduct and its principal place of
business have rules protecting defendants doing business
in those states from punitive damages while the accident
state permits liberal punitive damages. Air Crash Chicago
provides the grounds for arguing the dominance of the
interests of the airline-related states.
First, the court in Air Crash Chicago turned to Illinois law
only after it found that the interests of the two states con-
nected with the defendants had directly opposite interests
regarding punitive damages in wrongful death claims. ' 15
Therefore, if the defendant's principal place of business
and the alleged place of misconduct both disallow puni-
tive damages in wrongful death claims, resort to the acci-
dent state's law would seem technically unnecessary." l6
Nevertheless, to be safe, the defending airline must still
show the relative insignificance of the accident state's in-
terest. The following points may be of use in this
endeavor.
1. Fortuitousness of the Locale of the Accident
The Air Crash Chicago court pointed out that historically
the lex loci delicti rule developed from the fact that there
was nothing fortuitous about an injury's occurrence in a
particular jurisdiction."17 The court observed, however,
that "air crash disasters often present situations where the
115 Air Crash Chicago, 644 F.2d 594, 615, 620-21, 625, 628 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 878 (1981).
116 An important basis for this result is, of course, the fact that because air
crashes can happen in any number of jurisdictions, the state where the injury oc-
curred does not have as substantial a connection with the accident as it has to
accidents arising from conduct more confined to its borders. See id. at 615.
117 Id.
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place of injury is largely fortuitous." ' The court then
stated:
Because the place of injury is much more fortuitous than
the place of misconduct or the principal place of business,
its interest in and ability to control behavior by deterrence
or punishment, or to protect defendants from liability, is
lower than that of the place of misconduct or principal
place of business." 9
The court continued to say that, "merely as the place of
injury, Illinois would not have strong interests in protect-
ing nonresident defendants from excessive financial
liability.' ' 120
BUT BEWARE: The converse of this rule is not so
well-founded. It does not follow from the fact that the
place of injury has no strong interest in protecting non-
resident defendants from excessive liability that the place
of injury has an equally weak interest in deterring defend-
ants from the kind of behavior supporting punitive dam-
ages. In fact, the Air Crash Chicago court stated that
although Illinois' interest as the place of injury is not as
great as the interest of the principal place of business and
the interest of the alleged misconduct, Illinois neverthe-
less "has very strong interests in not suffering air crash
disasters and also in.promoting airplane safety [albeit, in-
terests which it chooses not to exercise when it rejects
wrongful-death punitive damages].''
SOLUTION: It can be argued, however, that as the fol-
lowing quote demonstrates, an integral element in the Air
Crash Chicago court's reasoning was the obvious fact that
many of the decedents resided in Illinois. 2 2 This factor is
related to the fact that the crash of American Flight 191
18 Id. (citing Cousins v. Instr. Flyers, Inc., 376 N.E.2d 914, 915 (N.Y. 1978)).
119 Id. at 615.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Unfortunately, the court does not specify how many decedents resided in
Illinois. But because 118 wrongful death actions were filed in only six transferror
states and because the flight originated in Chicago, it is fair to assume that a large
number of the deceased passengers were Illinoisans.
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occurred seconds after take-off, a procedure that, coupled
with landing, produces the majority of air crashes. 12
Both factors gave Illinois a degree of interest in the deter-
rent purpose of wrongful-death punitive damages, which
a lesser number of accident-state domiciliaries should not
confer upon that state. 2 4
The fact that Illinois has chosen not to exercise this
method of deterrence but rather to protect defendants
from punitive damage liability is immaterial to the theory
of this argument. It is the Air Crash Chicago court's assess-
ment of the degree of Illinois' potential interest in deter-
rence that counts. If the accident state has chosen
deterrence, it will be necessary to address and attempt to
distinguish Air Crash Chicago's evaluation of the strength of
this interest.
Airline defense counsel should be familiar with the fac-
tors that the Air Crash Chicago court discussed in choosing
the punitive damages law of Illinois, the accident site:
[I]n this case Illinois is more than merely the place of in-
jury. As noted before, many of the other contacts of sig-
nificance were in Illinois. With regard to the actions filed
in Illinois, all but two of the decedents resided in Illinois.
As the home of O'Hare International Airport, one of the
world's busiest airports, Illinois certainly has strong inter-
ests in encouraging air transportation corporations to do
business in the state.
Because Illinois has such strong interests in promoting
airline safety, it would have a strong interest in allowing
punitive damages to deter corporate misconduct relating
123 Recent data from the National Transportation Safety Board shows that dur-
ing the period 1983-1987, 42.1% of all Part 121, 125, 127 airline accidents oc-
curred during the standing, taxi, takeoff and climb phase of operation, and 33.1%
occurred during the descent, approach and landing phase. In contrast, 19.4% of
the accidents occurred during the cruise phase. During the years 1983-1987,
47.4% of the fatal accidents occurred during the standing, taxi, takeoff and climb
phase, 31.6% occurred during descent, approach and landing, and 10.5% oc-
curred during the cruise. NTSB, ANN. REv. OF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT DATA, U.S.
GENERAL AVIATION, CALENDAR YEAR 1987 (1989).
124 The fact that, as a practical matter, state laws do not shape the conduct of
aircraft manufacturers and carriers is immaterial to the Air Crash Chicago analyses
necessary to the air crash cases. See supra notes 66-89 and accompanying text.
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to air safety. But because Illinois also has such strong in-
terests in having airlines fly into and out of the state, and
having related transportation companies do business
within the state, it would have a strong interest in protect-
ing air transportation companies by disallowing punitive
damages. Thus, the decision made by the Illinois legisla-
ture [forbidding punitive damages in wrongful death ac-
tions] must be accorded special weight.' 25
A comparison of these contacts with those in potential
crashes yields the following possible considerations sup-
porting the rejection of the accident state's interest-or in
appropriate cases, its acceptance.
2. The Accident and Its Aftermath
The contacts of the accident itself and its post-accident
emergency relief and services will exist in every air crash
disaster.
3. Decedents' Residency
Although Air Crash Chicago explicitly holds that the
plaintiffs' domiciliary states have no legitimate interest in
disallowing or imposing punitive damages, 26 the passage
quoted above seems to give some weight to the fact that
many of the decedents resided in Illinois. As explained in
subsection 1, this weight can be justified on the ground
that the substantial number of Illinois residents conferred
upon Illinois an interest in the deterrent effect of wrong-
ful-death punitive damages. This factor will probably be
absent in air crashes occurring in one of the several states
over which commercial passenger flights frequently fly.
4. The Air Crash Chicago Flight's Takeoff in Illinois
In Air Crash Chicago the flight originated in Illinois, a fact
which arguably gave Illinois more contact with the acci-
dent than that possessed by accident states which are not
125 Air Crash Chicago, 644 F.2d at 615-16.
126 Id. at 612-13.
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the point of take-off or landing. As it has been noted, the
NTSB statistics show that by far the greatest numbers of
air crashes occur during these maneuvers. In addition, as
the Air Crash Chicago court noted, O'Hare Airport is one of
the world's busiest airports. 27 Indeed, the high volume
of O'Hare Airport's business far surpasses that of most
airfields that might be the unfortunate host to an air
crash. If the particular accident site is not such an air
transportation hub, the possibility (as unlikely as it is in
any case),' 28 that it could exert any deterrent power over
an airline's conduct diminishes.
V. COMPENSATORY DAMAGES
Although some courts have spoken of the deterrent ef-
fect of compensatory damages, 29 the better reasoning
makes a complete separation between punitive and com-
pensatory damages. For example, in Reich v. Purcell 131 the
California Supreme Court stated:
Limitations of damages for wrongful death . . . have little
or nothing to do with conduct. They are concerned not
with how people should behave but with how survivors
should be compensated. The state of the place of the
wrong has little or no interest in such compensation when
none of the parties reside there.'13
The choice of the law of the plaintiff's domicile is the
most sensible solution to conflicts concerning compensa-
127 Id. at 615.
128 See supra text accompanying note 119.
129 See, e.g., Scott v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 399 F.2d 14, 23 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 979 (1968); Schulhof v. Northeast Cellulose, Inc., 545 F. Supp. 1200,
1207-08 (D. Mass. 1982);Jennings v. Boeing Co., 660 F. Supp. 796, 808 (E.D. Pa.
1987), aff'd per curiam, 838 F.2d 1206 (3d Cir. 1988).
ISO 432 P.2d 727 (Cal. 1967).
13, Id. at 730-31. See also Gordon v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 391 F. Supp. 31, 33
(S.D.N.Y. 1975), in which the court rejected the law of the state where the plane
crashed. The court distinguished the choice of law analyses applicable to conduct
and compensation, stating that when considering the extent of recovery "where
the sole issue at bar is the measure of plaintiff's damages-the court must apply
the law of the place which has the dominant contacts with the parties and transac-
tion and the superior claim for application of its law." Id.
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tory damages. 32  The reason is that the plaintiff's state
has the most significant interest in the compensation of its
domiciliaries. 3 3  It is inconceivable that a plaintiff's
state's limits upon compensation 3 4 can be said to consti-
tute a desire to give its residents less than complete com-
pensation. 135  Rather, such limits embody the state's
132 In mass disasters, it will be simpler to relate all compensatory questions to
the law of the particular passenger's domicile rather than becoming enmeshed in
treating the laws of the domiciles of various plaintiffs who have causes of action.
This solution, however, can be challenged on the grounds that it neglects the
most basic reason for choosing the plaintiff's domicile-the plaintiff's state's in-
terest in ensuring that its residents receive proper relief and thus avoid becoming
wards of the state. See Hernandez v. Burger, 162 Cal. Rptr. 564, 567 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1980); Halstead v. United States, 535 F. Supp. 782, 788 (D. Conn. 1982),
aff'd, Saloomey v.Jeppeson & Co., 707 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1983). It would appear
that in Multidistrict Litigation it would be more likely that the MDL court would
accept such a simplification than would transferor courts which handle individual
cases after retransfer from the MDL court.
133 See, e.g., Reich v. Purcell, 432 P.2d 727 (Cal. 1967); Gordon v. Eastern Air-
lines, Inc., 391 F. Supp. 31 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
134 For example, see Colorado's ceiling on the amount recoverable for non-eco-
nomic losses in wrongful death actions. See supra note 68.
135 In Gordon, the court rejected the compensatory damages measurement of the
state, which was both the site of the accident and of the airline's principal place of
business, in favor of the more limited damages of the decedent's domicile.
Gordon, 391 F. Supp. at 34. The court noted that "the failure to apply New York
law in this case would 'impair the smooth working of the multi-state system [and]
produce great uncertainty for litigants by sanctioning forum shopping ... thereby
allowing a party to select a forum which could give him a larger recovery than the
court of his own domicile.'" Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting from Neumeier v.
Kuehner, 286 N.E.2d 454, 458 (N.Y. 1972)).
In Howe v. Diversified Builders, Inc., 69 Cal. Rptr. 56 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968), a
Nevada plaintiff sued California corporations for personal injuries occurring in
Nevada. The court affirmed the summary judgment for the defendants, holding
that Nevada's exclusive workmen's compensation barred the suit. In refusing to
apply California's more liberal law, the court stated:
California has no interest in extending to Nevada residents greater
rights than are afforded them by the state of their domicile .... [N]o
California "interest" would be promoted by impairing the ability of
California corporations to compete for business in other states by
imposing upon them obligations to the residents of such states
which those states do not impose upon foreign corporations or their
own domestic corporations.
Id. at 59.
Similarly, in Ryan v. Clark Equip. Co., 74 Cal. Rptr. 329 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969),
the court rejected the plaintiff's claim that the more liberal law of the manufac-
turer's state, Michigan, should govern the plaintiff's wrongful death suit. The
court applied the law of Oregon, the place of the decedent's and his family's resi-
dency, which foreclosed the suit. Citing Reich and Howe, the court stated:
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policy not to unduly burden defendants, including corpo-
rations doing business within its borders.
The defendant's state is clearly not as closely connected
to compensation as the plaintiff's state. The defendant
state has no interest in benefitting a foreign plaintiff with
a more generous recovery than the plaintiff's own state
permits. Conversely, the defendant who benefits from
business conducted with plaintiffs from other states can
hardly complain about being subject to the compensatory
damages imposed by those states.
An application of the Restatement's choice of law prin-
ciples to the issue of compensatory damages follows.
A. APPLICATION OF SECTION 6's GENERAL FACTORS TO
THE ISSUE OF COMPENSATORY DAMAGES SOUGHT
AGAINST BUSINESSES OPERATING
NATIONWIDE
1. Needs of the Interstate and International Systems
There can be no disruption of the interstate system
when the plaintiffs are accorded the compensatory recov-
ery permitted by their own domiciliary states. Similar
rules embraced by both the plaintiff's state and the de-
fendant's state obviously present no problem. If the de-
fendant benefits from substantial business in the
plaintiff's state, the defendant's state has no legitimate
complaint when the plaintiff's state permits a greater re-
covery than it does.13 6 Conversely, the defendant's state
can have no legitimate complaint if the plaintiff's state
"Neither California nor Michigan has any interest in extending to Oregon resi-
dents any greater rights than are afforded by the state of residence." Id. at 331-
32. The court added, "to apply the law of Michigan on the facts of this case is to
encourage forum shopping by litigants." Id. at 332.
Because compensation has nothing to do with conduct, the fact that in both
Howe and Ryan the accident occurred in the plaintiffs' states as a result of opera-
tions there, does not diminish the application of the reasoning of these cases to
others in which the accident happened elsewhere.
'-6 See Pacific Diamond Co. v. Superior Court of San Francisco, 85 Cal. 3d 871,
876 n.l (Cal. Ct. App. 1978).
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grants greater protection to businesses within its borders
than does the defendant's state.
2. The Relevant Policies of the Forum
The states with the most intimate connection to issues
of compensatory damages are the ones with the most di-
rect interest in the plaintiff's monetary recovery and/or
the most direct interest in protecting the defendant
against financial hardship. These considerations point to
the plaintiff's and defendant's domiciliary states.
Although a forum state which is not also the domicile of
either the plaintiff or the defendant may have an interest
in compensatory damages, this interest is inferior to the
interests of either the plaintiff's state or the state of the
defendant's principal place of business.
First, the fact that a forum state's recovery may be less
than the amount permitted by the plaintiff's state does
not negate the reality that, by doing business in the plain-
tiff's state, the defendant subjects itself to that standard of
care for its residents. Any desire by the forum state to
protect businesses from undue economic burdens must
yield to the plaintiff's state's interest in protecting its
residents.
Second, if the plaintiff's state permits less compensa-
tion than does the forum state, the latter plainly has no
interest in burdening the defendant with a recovery that
the plaintiff's own state does not consider warranted.
In air crash cases, some plaintiffs might be tempted to
choose a forum with a more liberal compensatory rule
than that of their domiciliary states. In rejecting the com-
pensatory damages rule of the state of both the accident
and the airline's principal place of business in favor of the
more limited damages of the decedent's domicile, the
court in Gordon v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc. 13 7 noted that to do
otherwise would encourage forum shopping. 38 A forum
117 391 F. Supp. 31 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
138 Id. at 34.
1993] 965
966 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [58
state surely has no more interest than that of the state
which hosts both the accident and the defendant's princi-
pal place of business as was the case in Gordon. The dis-
cussion of Section 145's contacts in subsection B
demonstrates that the forum state, as such, gains no legiti-
mate interest in addition to that which it has if it is one of
the party's domiciles.
3. Relevant Policies and Interests of Other Concerned States
The significance of the interests of states other than the
forum-place of accident, place of alleged misconduct,
center of the parties' relationship, parties' domiciles-will
be covered in the discussion of section 145's contacts.
4. The Remaining Factors of Section 6
The defending airline's discussion of the actual domicil-
iary interests in a case should demonstrate that the appli-
cation of the compensatory damages rules of the
passengers' states will certainly protect justified expecta-
tions, serve the basic policies of compensatory damages,
and foster certainty, predictability, and uniformity of re-
sult as well as ease in the determination and application of
law. Indeed, in air crash litigation, at least two factors
compel the application of the compensatory damages law
of the injured or deceased passenger in order to avoid un-
necessary and unjustifiable complication.
a) A plaintiff may recover against more than one de-
fendant, each having a different domicile and a different
site of wrongful conduct. In such a situation, the adop-
tion of the compensatory damages rule of the passenger's
domicile will avoid the anomaly of attempting to appor-
tion damages among defendants whose liability is mea-
sured under differing standards.
b) In the case of a deceased passenger whose heirs may
reside in a number of states, the adoption of the passen-
ger's domicile will avoid the necessity of applying a variety
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of different compensatory damages standards. t3 9
B. APPLICATION OF SECTION 145's CONTACTS TO
COMPENSATORY DAMAGES IN AIR CRASH
LITIGATION
Three of section 145's four contacts-(1) the place of
injury, (2) the place of the conduct causing the injury, and
(3) the place where the relationship between the parties is
centered-are not significant to the issue of compensatory
damages limitations.
1. The Irrelevance of the Compensatory Law of the Place of
Injury
The place of the injury, as such, has no legitimate inter-
est which could be implemented by applying its compen-
satory measurements to this case. Although a defending
airline will most likely serve the accident state, this fact
does not give the state a significant interest in imposing a
liberal damages rule in favor of non-resident plaintiffs and
to the detriment of a corporation which contributes sub-
stantially to its economy. In the first place, unlike punitive
damages, compensatory damages are properly considered
not as deterring future actions but as measuring relief
once liability has been determined. But even if the impo-
sition of the accident state's compensatory standards
could be considered a deterrent to conduct in some in-
stances, it could not be so considered in a case in which
the site of the accident's occurrence was fortuitous.
40
2. Irrelevance of the Compensatory Law of the Place of
Misconduct Causing the Injury
The place of the conduct causing the injury is irrelevant
139 But see supra note 132.
140 See Air Crash Sioux City, 734 F. Supp. 1425, 1431, 1435 (N.D. Ill. 1990). In
Kaczmarek v. Allied Chem. Corp., 836 F.2d 1055, 1058 (7th Cir. 1987) and
Kozoway v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 722 F. Supp. 641, 643 (D. Colo. 1989), the
courts applied the doctrine of fortuity to personal-injury claims inflicted by truck-
ing equipment and farm machinery, respectively.
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because compensatory damages do not properly concern
conduct. 141 Although some courts consider compensa-
tory damages to be a deterrent, 42 this view seems funda-
mentally flawed, for it is based upon the untenable
assumption that differences in states' compensatory limits
reflect varying degrees of commitment to their residents'
safety. In reality, it is the differing substantive standards
of care which constitute states' differences concerning the
degree of safety they demand. Once a state has defined
its tort standard of care, it cannot reasonably be said that
any limits upon compensatory recovery exhibit a diluted
commitment to this standard of care.1 43
3. Diffculty of Identifying the "Center of the Parties'
Relationship" and Any Such Place's Lack of
Significant Interest in Compensatory Damages
In air crash cases "[i]t is unclear where the relationship
of the parties is 'centered.' ",144 Even in regard to more
local airline operations, the center of the parties' relation-
ship does not merit much consideration. 145 In the case of
an international airline such a consideration is even more
unrealistic. The ability of passengers to purchase tickets
almost anywhere in the world for flights originating and
terminating anywhere else renders the locus of a particu-
lar passenger's pre-flight dealings with an airline unim-
portant if not fortuitous. Certainly, purchasing of a ticket
'4' Gordon v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 391 F. Supp. 31, 33 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Reich
v. Purcell, 432 P.2d 727, 730-31 (Cal. 1967).
142 See supra note 129.
143 See Long v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 213 N.E.2d 796, 798 (1965); In re
Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, 821 F.2d 1147, 1175 (5th Cir. 1987)(Gee,
J., dissenting), vacated, Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. Lopez, 490 U.S. 1032
(1989).
'4' Air Crash Chicago, 644 F.2d 594, 612 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 878
(1981).
145 See Bonn v. Puerto Rico Int'l Airlines, Inc., 518 F.2d 89, 92 (1st Cir. 1975)
(per curiam), disapproved by Donovan v. Shipping Co., 429 U.S. 648 (1977), in
which the court stated that "[A]lthough one factor in contacts analysis is 'the place
where the relationship is centered' i.e ... where the tickets were bought, such a
factor does not, in this kind of relationship, warrant a heavy weight in the scales."
Id.; see also Bryant v. Silverman, 703 P.2d 1190, 1195 (Ariz. 1985).
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on a commercial flight does not constitute the kind of ac-
tivity for which "the center of the parties' relationship"
was designed to account, namely, activities to which some
local legal standard has reason to attach.
Furthermore, the impossibility of assigning a meaning-
ful center of the relationship between interstate passen-
gers and airlines frustrates the "justified expectation", the
"certainty, predictability and uniformity of result", and
the "ease in the determination of the law to be applied"
which the Restatement desires. Finally, if it is necessary
to assign a locus of relationship apart from the plane it-
self, the better option is to consider the passenger's domi-
cile-where the passenger at least begins or ends the
journey. An arbitrary center could not have legitimate in-
terests in compensatory damages standards equal to that
of the domiciliary states.
The irrelevance of the foregoing three contacts leaves
only one of Section 145's contacts to be considered, the
interests of the passengers' and the airline's residences.
4. Plaintiff's State's Paramount Interest in Measuring Its
Residents' Compensation and In Enforcing Any Rules
Which Protect the Business Conducted Within the
State
A defendant's state plainly has no interest per se in maxi-
mizing a non-resident plaintiff's compensatory recovery.
In Gordon v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc. ,146 the court refused to
apply the liberal damages rule of Florida, the state of both
the accident and Eastern's principal place of business.
The court said, "[s]ince the issue of defendant's conduct
is not here involved, Florida has no interest in the applica-
tion of its [more liberal] law to the narrow issue of dam-
ages before the court simply because the accident
occurred within its borders."'' 47 Because conduct was not
in issue, the court also discounted Florida's possible inter-
146 391 F. Supp. 31 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
147 Id. at 33.
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est in promoting tourism with the potential deterrent of
its liberal damages rule. 4 8 Though some cases deviate
from this norm, their particular grounds may be easily dis-
tinguishable from most litigation which is likely to arise
against a major airline. 49
The plaintiff's state has an essential interest in its resi-
dent's recovery for actual pecuniary loss. In addition, the
plaintiff's state may wish to protect entities conducting
business within its borders by putting limits on compensa-
tory awards. The former interest is a common one shared
by all states in regard to their domiciliaries: to ensure that
plaintiffs receive proper relief for pecuniary loss and avoid
becoming wards of the state. 50 Any limitation upon com-
pensatory awards embodies the plaintiff's state's concur-
148 Id.; see also Huang v. Lee, 734 F. Supp. 71, 74-75 (E.D.N.Y. 1990); Her-
nandez v. Burger, 162 Cal. Rptr. 564, 567 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980).
149 Although some decisions apply the defendant-state's more liberal damages
rule instead of the plaintiff-state's more restricted rule, they do so because the
plaintiff's state has absolutely no interest in protecting the defendant, because the
court deems that its interest as forum to be of great importance, or because the
court perceives the place of defendant's conduct to be important. For example, in
Hurtado v. Superior Court, 522 P.2d 666, 670 (Cal. 1974), the court stated that
Mexico had no interest in applying its limitations of damages rule to its domicili-
ary plaintiffs injured by non-Mexican defendants. However, the individual Cali-
fornia defendant had no connection to Mexico which could have even suggested
the possibility that Mexico's limitations were for his protection. In Hurtado, Mex-
ico's lack of interest resulted in the adoption of the forum's damages measure-
ment. This adoption, however, was not merely the result of Mexico's default: the
court also relied on the fact that the California defendant's tortious conduct oc-
curred in California. Id. at 672-74. In Bonn v. Puerto Rico Int'l Airlines, Inc., 518
F.2d 89, 92 (lst Cir. 1975), the court, citing Hurtado, speaks of the presumption
that the law of the forum should apply. Application of any such presumption in
the present case would encourage forum shopping. See discussion above.
15o See Halstead v. United States, 535 F. Supp. 782, 788 (D. Conn. 1982), aff'd,
Saloomey v. Jeppesen & Co., 707 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1983); Hernandez, 162 Cal.
Rptr. at 567. In both Halstead and Feldman v. Acapulco Princess Hotel, 520
N.Y.S.2d 477, 486 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987) the courts rejected the domiciliary states'
interest in their plaintiffs' recovery in favor of the more limited damages rule of
the defendants' jurisdictions. In Halstead, the court stated that the plaintiff's state
had little interest in burdening the defendant with liability in excess of the actual
losses sustained by the survivors. Halstead, 535 F. Supp. at 788-89. In Feldman,
the court stated that New York's interests in ensuring that its medical creditors
will be paid and that its injured domiciliaries will not become wards of the state
are undercut by the widespread availability of travel and medical insurance. Feld-
man, 520 N.Y.S.2d at 491. The court deferred to Mexico's interest in encouraging
the resort industry by limiting its potential liability. Id. This reasoning, of course,
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rent desire to protect and encourage business within its
borders. Indeed, the Air Crash Chicago court recognized
that a plaintiff's state might have a considerable interest
in enforcing a rule which protected airlines providing
transportation services to the state, even if to do so would
disadvantage its residents.' 5
A major airline will likely serve most if not all of the
states where passengers reside. If a passenger's state's
rule maximizes recovery, the airline must bear the respon-
sibility attendant upon its conduct of business there.1
5 2
By the same token, however, if a passenger's state seeks to
encourage and protect business within its borders by lim-
iting compensatory damages, the airline must not be put
at a relative disadvantage simply because it is a resident of
another state. The refusal of some courts to apply a plain-
tiff's state's compensatory limitations to foreign defend-
ants reflects one of three things: 1) either facts different
from those in the present case;153 2) particularly unwieldy
cannot be applied when the defendant's principal place of business puts no such
limits upon recovery.
15, See Air Crash Chicago, 644 F.2d 594, 615-16 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
878 (1981). The court noted that although Illinois, the residence of many of the
crash victims had a strong interest in promoting airline safety by means of a puni-
tive damages rule, it also has strong interests in encouraging air commerce with
its protective rule against punitive damages. Id.
152 See, e.g., Pacific Diamond Co. v. Superior Court, 149 Cal. Rptr. 813, 816 n.1
(Cal. Ct. App. 1978).
153 In O'Rourke v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 730 F.2d 842 (2d Cir. 1984), the court
stated that New York would not apply the more favorable damages law of Greece
to favor the Greek plaintiff where New York was the forum state, the tortious
conduct occurred in New York, the defendants had "substantial contacts with the
state, and it was plain they did not have similar connections to Greece." Id. at
850-51.
Although in Barkanic v. General Admin. of Civil Aviation of the People's Re-
public Of China, 923 F.2d 957 (2d Cir. 1991) the court held that under New York
choice-of-law the Chinese limitation governed the New York plaintiff's compensa-
tory damages, this ruling is not applicable to the present case. In Barkanic, the
court stated that since the defendant had absolutely no connection to New York,
there was no basis to support the application of New York's more liberal damages
measurement. Id. at 964. Instead, the court relied on a New York case between
individual parties which stated that when an automobile driver's conduct and the
resulting accident occurred in his own state, that state's guest statute must be
applied to prevent his liability. Id. at 962. Even if Barkanic had the force of New
York law, its ruling should not extend to an aircraft crash involving a major airline
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problems in the number of plaintiff's residencies and ac-
cessibility of their resident jurisdiction's laws;' 54 or 3)
questionable reasoning. 55 In any case, the plaintiff has
no reasonable complaint about compensation which is the
conducting extensive business in each of the victims's states. Such a case involves
not only the plaintiff's states' interest in having its domiciliaries properly compen-
sated but any concurrent interest in protecting the business conducted within its
borders. The fact that compensatory damages do not properly concern conduct
confirms the importance of an injured person's state's particular balance between
proper compensation and protection of economic activity.
Decisions sometimes state that limitations upon compensatory recovery are for
the benefit of resident defendants only. See, e.g., Hurtado v. Superior Court of
Sacramento County, 522 P.2d 666, 671 (Cal. 1970); Reyno v. Piper Aircraft Co.,
630 F.2d 149, 168 n.76 (3d Cir. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 454 U.S. 235 (1981);
In re Paris Air Crash, 399 F. Supp. 732, 743 (C.D. Cal. 1975). When the defendant
has no connection to the plaintiff's state, such language is merely the vehicle for
the sensible exclusion of the plaintiff-state's limitations. Reyno, 630 F.2d at 168
n.76; Hurtado, 522 P.2d at 670-72. When the defendant does substantial business
in the plaintiff's state, however, this reasoning does not apply. A state's limita-
tions upon damages must be regarded as protecting all businesses which bring
economic benefit to the state. Therefore, it would make no sense to dismiss that
state's interest just because the defendant's principal place of business happens to
be elsewhere.
5 Although Paris Air Crash cites Reich v. Purcell, 432 P.2d 727 (Cal. 1967), and
Hurtado to support its ruling that foreign jurisdictions would have no interest in
limiting their residents' recovery, Paris Air Crash, 399 F. Supp. at 742-43, the rea-
soning in these cases does not extend either to the situation in Paris Air Crash or to
that of the present case. In Reich it was the place of the accident which had no
interest in limiting the non-resident plaintiff's recovery against the non-resident
defendant. Reich, 432 P.2d at 731. In Hurtado the individual California defendant
had absolutely no connection to Mexico, the plaintiffs' domicile. Hurtado, 522
P.2d at 670. In Paris Air Crash the difficulties of dealing with the laws of twenty
four foreign jurisdictions and twelve states gave the court a decisive incentive to
look to the law of California, the forum as well as the place of the conduct upon
which the court focused. See Paris Air Crash, 399 F. Supp. at 744.
155 In Bonn v. Puerto Rico Int'l Airlines, Inc., 518 F.2d 89 (1st Cir. 1975), bene-
ficiaries sued Puerto Rico International Airlines for recovery for their Virgin Is-
lands decedents' deaths in a crash occurring in Puerto Rico. In refusing to apply
the Virgin Islands' limitations upon damages, the court acknowledged that the
Virgin Islands may have had some interest in protecting the airlines, which was
doing business there, from large recoveries. Id. at 92. But the court stated that
the airline did much more business in Puerto Rico and was also domiciled and
managed there. Id. It is plain, however, that the court's guiding assumption was
that Puerto Rico had a superior, deterrent interest in applying its law. Id.
The elimination of this flawed assumption leaves Puerto Rico with no interest in
burdening its resident defendant in favor of foreign plaintiffs, and the Virgin Is-
lands' interest in its domiciliaries' recovery and in protecting business within its
borders was paramount. In addition, plaintiffs' suit in the defendant's state per-
mitted the court to find support in the importance of the forum, an importance
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same as it would have been had the accident been a purely
local one. 56
In sum, the most sensible application of the Restate-
ment's standards is to apply the law of the injured per-
son's domicile to all issues concerning the availability and
measurement of compensatory damages.
VI. CONTRIBUTION
It is difficult to endorse enthusiastically the traditional
rule that the right to equitable contribution is governed
by the law of the place of the tort. 57 This is because con-
tribution has nothing to do with conduct, the considera-
tion which most strongly invokes the law of the place of
the tort. It is equally difficult, however, to formulate a
sensible approach to the solution of conflicts in equitable
that in the present case would promote and reward forum-shopping. See Gordon
v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 391 F. Supp. 31, 34 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
In judge v. American Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 1565 (11 th Cir. 1990) a Mexican
plaintiff sued Michigan corporations for wrongful death resulting from an auto-
mobile accident in Mexico. In refusing to apply Mexico's proscription of wrongful
death actions, the court stated that while Mexico's rule might reveal a desire to
protect non-resident business, the record contained no evidence which could sat-
isfy the causal link between its protectionist rule and the defendant's decision to
do business in Mexico. Id. at 1572-73. This causal requirement rests on the
court's unsupported assumption that Mexico intended to extend its protection
only to those businesses for whom it is the decisive factor. The cumbersome spec-
ulation which such an inquiry would require can only be explained by the court's
obvious desire to avoid the inequitable result of applying Mexico's law. See id at
1574-75.
In Lewis-DeBoer v. Mooney Aircraft Corp., 728 F. Supp. 642 (D. Colo. 1990)
the court ruled against applying Colorado's caps on wrongful death and personal
injury damages to Colorado residents and instead applied the more liberal mea-
sure of Texas, the principal place of the defendant's business. Id. at 646. In its
statement, "there is no injustice to a corporation in applying the law of the state
where it has chosen to locate its principal place of business," the court seems
unaware that the uniform acceptance of its rule would likely encourage state legis-
latures to enter a damage-reduction sweepstakes in order to attract businesses.
Id. (quoting Kozoway v. Massey-Ferguson Inc., 722 F. Supp. 641 (D. Colo. 1989)).
Such a result would surely disrupt the appropriate balance between states' desire
to fully compensate injured parties and to protect businesses from undue
burdens.
156 See De Foor v. Lematta, 437 P.2d 107, 109-10 (Or. 1968).
15, See E. H. Schopler, Annotation, What Law Governs Right to Contribution or In-
demnity Between Tortfeasors, 95 A.L.R.2d 1096, 1102 (1964).
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contribution laws.'"" If counsel are fortunate, both
tortfeasors will be domiciled in the same state, a status
giving that state "the greatest interest in the issue of con-
tribution."' 59 In air crash litigation, however, the contri-
bution parties are not likely to share the same domicile.
Alternatively, contribution problems might be reduced if
the interested states have adopted the Uniform Contribu-
tion Among Tortfeasors Act of 1939160 and the 1955 Re-
vised Act. 161 Most likely, however, counsel would have to
grapple with a subject which does not yield even the rela-
tively satisfactory solutions which choice-of-law some-
times permits. The problem exists in regard to substance
as well as procedure-to the extent that the two can be
separated at all.
Although it is difficult to discern a legitimate purpose in
state laws which forbid the equitable division of liability
among defendants responsible for the injury, a number of
states either do just that or very narrowly limit the right of
contribution. 62 It is similarly hard to make a reasoned
choice among potentially crucial differences in states' pre-
requisites for recovering contribution. 63  A party in-
volved in complex litigation following an air crash, for
example, will want to be sure that settlement will not
158 "The existence of a contractual right to indemnity, and the rights created
thereby, are determined by the law selected by application of the rules of §§ 187-
188." RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 173, cmt. b.
159 See id. § 173, cmt. a.
160 UNIF. CONTRIBUTION AMONG ToRTFEASORs ACT, § 12 U.L.A. 57 (1939).
Eight states, Arkansas, Delaware, Hawaii, Maryland, New Mexico, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island and South Dakota, still adhere to versions of the Uniform Contribu-
tion Among Tortfeasors Act of 1939. However, even if the interested states are
among this list, counsel must carefully compare their versions of the Act for uni-
formity, because many adopting states made important changes.
161 UNIF. CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORs ACT, 1955 Revised Act, § 12
U.L.A. 63 (1955). Eleven states, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Massachusetts, Ne-
vada, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Ten-
nessee, enacted versions of the 1955 Revised Uniform Contribution Among
Tortfeasors Act, but once again, counsel must check carefully for conflicts.
162 See the state-by-state review of tort laws in DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE,
supra note 12. For a brief historical review of contribution and its unsatisfactory
treatment in the United States, see W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON
ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 50, at 336-41 (5th ed. 1984).
163 Particular state rules can be decisive. Compare, for example, the following:
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jeopardize its contribution rights and that its settlement
procedure and releases are in a form which permits the
later recovery of contribution from its co-defendants.' 64
In a state where contribution is a common-law right, it is
likely that the procedural prerequisites for contribution
Restrictive Prerequisites To Contribution
In order to recover contribution in Illinois when there is an underlying tort
action, the defendant seeking contribution must make its claim during that action's
pendency. Laue v. Leifheit, 473 N.E.2d 939, 941-42 (Ill. 1984). This rule holds
even when the tort cause of action is settled rather than tried, other claims are
tried only as to the issue of damages after liability is admitted. See Arkansas Best
Freight Sys., Inc. v. Illinois News Serv., Inc., 512 N.E.2d 1063, 1065 (Ill. App. Ct.
1987). The filing of counterclaims for contribution after the parties have rested
their cases does not fulfill the requirement of filing during the underlying tort
action's pendency. Henry v. St.John's Hosp., 563 N.E.2d 410, 416-17 (Il1. 1990),
cert. denied, Ill S. Ct. 1623 (1991).
In Kantlehner v. United States, 279 F. Supp. 122 (E.D.N.Y. 1967), the court
declined to apply the contribution law of Maryland, the fortuitous situs of the air
crash in which the plaintiff's decedent was killed. Instead, the court applied the
contribution law of New York, the decedent's residence, the home base of the
aircraft, and the domicile of one of the third-party defendants. Id. at 127. Unfor-
tunately, however, the contribution claim was foreclosed by New York's require-
ments that a joint judgment must be entered and the defendant seeking
contribution must have paid more than its pro rata share. Id. The court chose
New York law in part because it found that its requirements exhibited a policy
favoring New York plaintiffs: "One purpose [of the requirements] is to give New
York plaintiffs the right to commence and prosecute their actions, and to satisfy
any judgment that they may be awarded, without having to contend with undue
interference or delay resulting from controversies among their adversaries." Id.
at 127. It is difficult, however, to see how New York's requirement of joint judg-
ment makes the plaintiff's recovery any easier than it would be if, for example, he
recovered a judgment against a single tortfeasor and left the joint tortfeasors to
fight among themselves. Such stretching might perhaps be more understandable
if the object were to designate the law of a state which permitted contribution.
A More Liberal Approach
IowA CODE ANN. § 668.5 (West 1987) permits a right of contribution to be "en-
forced either in the original action or by separate action brought for that pur-
pose." Id.
164 New Mexico and Texas impose restrictions upon settling tortfeasors' right
to contribution. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-3-2 (Michie 1978); Bonniwell v. Beech
Aircraft Corp., 663 S.W.2d 816, 819 (Tex. 1984).
Illinois, for example, requires the settlement release to discharge the liability of
the non-settling party who contributed to the injury. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 70,
§ 302(e) (Smith-Hurd 1989). California, on the other hand, appears to permit a
settling tortfeasor to sue a concurrent tortfeasor whose liability has not been ex-
tinguished. See Sears Roebuck & Co. v. International Harvester Co., 147 Cal. Rptr.
262, 264-65 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978); Bolamperti v. Larco Mfg., 210 Cal. Rptr. 155,
159 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985); Mullin Lumber Co. v. Chandler, 230 Cal. Rptr. 122, 124
(Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
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will be governed by the forum.' 6 5 However, if the choice
of law falls upon a statute conferring contribution rights,
it is likely that the procedures included in the statute
would be considered inseparable from the substantive
right itself.16 6  This conclusion could impose significant
restrictions upon the recovery of contribution even when
the law of a state which permits contribution is chosen.
For example, since Iowa Code section 668.5 states that
the "basis for contribution is each person's equitable
share of the obligations, including the share of fault of a
claimant [that is, the plaintiff], as determined in accord-
ance with section 668.3," 167 the detailed calculation of
16- See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank in St. Petersburg v. Hoffman, No. 60090, 1991 WL
18686 at *1 (Ohio App. Feb. 14, 1991), jurisdictional motion overruled by 574
N.E.2d 1092 (Ohio 1991), in which the court, citing Restatement Sections 122
and 131, affirmed the trial court's ruling that Ohio's requirement of a separate
action for contribution prevailed over Florida's rule authorizing a judgment as-
signee to obtain contribution in the same action in which the judgment was ob-
tained. See also Perez v. Short Line Inc., 231 A.2d 642, 642-43 (Del. Super. Ct.
1967), aff'd, 238 A.2d 341 (Del. 1968) a pre-Restatement (Second) case in which
the court, citing, inter alia, § 585 of the first Restatement, held that Delaware's
categorization of contribution as a "matter of remedy" foreclosed any considera-
tion of Delaware's and Pennsylvania's conflicting rules and mandated the applica-
tion of the law of the forum. Section 122 of the Restatement (Second) does not
speak in terms of "remedy" but deals with "Issues relating to Judicial Administra-
tion," which, in comment a's terms, are issues "relating to judicial administration,
such as the proper form of action, rules of discovery, mode of trial and execution
and costs." RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 122.
- In Maryland v. Capital Airlines, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 648, 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1964),
for example, the court rejected the law of the place of injury, Maryland, in favor of
the law of New York, the place most closely associated with the contractual deal-
ings of the parties to the contribution suit. The contribution-plaintiff's claim suc-
cumbed to New York's prerequisite that a joint judgment be rendered against the
contribution plaintiff and defendant and that the contribution plaintiff has paid
more than his pro rata share.
167 IOWA CODE ANN. § 668.5 (West 1987). Among the requirements of § 668.3,
for example, is the answering of special interrogatories or findings concerning:
a. The amount of damages each claimant will be entitled to recover
if contributory fault is disregarded; b. The percentage of the total
fault allocated to each claimant, defendant, third-party defendant,
and person who has been released from liability under section 668.7.
For this purpose the court may determine that two or more persons
are treated as a single party. In determining the percentages of
fault, the trier of fact shall consider both the nature of the conduct of
each party and the extent of the causal relation between the conduct
and the damages claimed.
Id. § 668.3.
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comparative fault prescribed in Iowa Code section 668.3
might be considered essential to the right to contribution
under Iowa's statute. 168
Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Allied Corp. 169 illustrates the dif-
ficulty of solving contribution conflicts under the present
requirement that federal courts apply the choice rules of
the states in which they sit. In Consolidated Rail, Conrail
sued Allied Corporation for contribution on settlements
Conrail made following a chemical leak from a Conrail car
that injured a number of people in Elkhart, Indiana. Al-
lied had unloaded the toxic chemicals from the car in Illi-
nois and had labeled the car as empty. Even though
Indiana's lex loci rule prohibited contribution, and even
though Illinois, where Allied had unloaded the chemicals
and mislabeled the car as empty, permitted contribution,
the Seventh Circuit held that Conrail's acts within Indiana
gave that state sufficient contact with the contribution liti-
gation to impose its own law forbidding contribution.
Initially, the court recognized the error of considering
contribution as having any relationship with the underly-
ing tort other than the equitable division of the liability
arising from it. 170 In the absence of any request for appli-
cation of a different rule, however, the court apparently
felt obliged to analyze the choice-of-law problem under
Indiana choice-of-law for torts 17 1 which applies the law of
168 See Iowa Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Granneman, 438 N.W.2d 840, 842 (Iowa
1989) (enforcing the statute's one-year statute of limitations) and Baldwin v. City
of Waterloo, 372 N.W.2d 486, 492-93 (Iowa 1985) (enforcing the statute's defini-
tion of parties).
16 882 F.2d 254 (7th Cir. 1989).
170 The court stated:
We cannot agree that the proper focus is on the underlying tort and
thus disagree that the injuries and losses to Elkhart citizens give In-
diana a significant contact with this litigation. The current litigation
involves only a question of who will bear the ultimate financial re-
sponsibility for the damages arising from the chemical leak. The cit-
izens of Elkhart, who have already been made whole, have no
interest in this case.
Id. at 257.
7,' The court noted that an action for contribution "is based on equitable prin-
ciples, in the nature of unjust enrichment, resulting from an overpayment by one
of a group of tortfeasors .... Thus, it might be sensible to apply the law of the
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the accident situs as long as it has a significant contact to
the litigation. 72 The court concentrated on the basis of
Conrail's underlying liability because, under Indiana law,
whether or not the place of the tort has a significant con-
tact with the litigation depends in large part on the theory
of recovery propounded in the litigation-here the under-
lying personal injury causes. The court ruled that the In-
diana residents' strict liability claims against Conrail
supported Conrail's contribution claim and "inexorably
tie[d] this action to Indiana."' 73 The court held that since
the escape of the abnormally dangerous gas in Indiana
constituted a significant contact with the contribution liti-
gation, Indiana required the application of the lex loci
delicti and the consequent failure of Conrail's claim.
This result is completely unsatisfactory because the un-
derlying tort is not the proper focus of the contribution
inquiry which should be confined solely to the dividing of
liability which has already been determined. 74 In addi-
tion, even if conduct, rather than the division of liability,
were the proper focus of the choice of law analysis, the
state where the overpayment occurred resulting in the unjust enrichment." Id. at
256. Nevertheless, the court followed the majority approach of applying the tort
choice-of-law rule since neither party argued for a different rule.
172 The court explained that Indiana's choice of law rule for torts was that:
the lex loci delicti rule will be applied only where the place of the tort
has a significant contact to the legal action .... Where the contact
with the place of the tort is insignificant, then the court must con-
sider other factors such as:
1) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred;
2) the residence or place of business of the parties; and
3) the place where the relationship is centered.
Id.
73 Id. at 258.
174 Of course, if the state of the party against whom contribution is sought for-
bids the particular cause of action upon which the contribution-seeker bases its
claim, perhaps it would make sense to say that state would have an interest in
preventing its policy from indirect erosion by successful contribution claims aris-
ing from the prohibited cause of action. But Consolidated Rail presented no such
situation. In the first place, the court did not discuss Conrail's theory of Allied's
liability. Furthermore, both Illinois and Indiana recognize the strict liability ac-
tion upon which Conrail relied in its contribution claim. The court's speculation
is perplexing, since a mechanical application of the law of the state when overpay-
ment was made would surely not guarantee an equitable result.
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conduct of the contribution defendant (Allied) would
seem to be at least as important for consideration as the
basis for the contribution plaintiff's (Conrail's) liability.
The inequity of applying Indiana's rule to this case is
manifest. Allied escaped contribution liability even
though it was the one that emptied the car and labeled it
as empty, and even though Conrail's liability was based on
liability without fault. Shackled by the necessity to apply
Indiana's rule, the court did not bother to discuss the sig-
nificance of Illinois' contact with the negligent unloading
and subsequent mislabeling-Allied's conduct, which sup-
ported Conrail's contribution claim.
Contribution is a very different kind of issue from, for
example, the issue of punitive damages in which a state's
denial of such damages represents an interest in protect-
ing defendants from undue economic burden. This inter-
est is just as great as the interest in deterrence embodied
by the opposite rule. Section 173 of the Restatement,
provides a solution which, if not inherently satisfying, at
least solves the problem: "The law selected by application
of the Rule of § 145 [which sets forth the contacts to be
considered to determine which law controls a given issue]
determines whether one tortfeasor has a right to contribu-
tion or indemnity against another tortfeasor."'' 75  Com-
ment (a) of section 173 provides in part:
The state where conduct and injury occurred will not by
reason of these contacts alone be the state that is primarily
concerned with the question whether one tortfeasor may
obtain contribution against another. The local law of this
state will, however, be applied unless some other state has a greater
interest in the determination of the particular issue.176
171 RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 173.
176 Id. cmt. a (emphasis added). Frequently, the question of how to determine
the place of wrong is vague enough when the question concerns the defendants'
underlying liability itself. In the context of contribution, the question resists the
formulation of any reasonable approach to the issue.
When the issues concern the defendant's or defendants' primary liability, deter-
mining the place of the wrong is directly concerned with conduct. The impor-
tance to liability issues to the state whose interest is identified by this
determination derives from that state's desire to affect behavior or protect busi-
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VII. CONCLUSION
Choice-of-law problems may occasionally seem as ab-
struse as determining the number of angels who can
dance on the head of a pin or whether, in going from one
extreme to another, an angel must pass through the mid-
dle. It is hoped that the approaches to particular
problems, whether they are hypothetical or, as in the case
of punitive and compensatory damages, substantially
researched, demonstrate that the resort to basic consider-
ations will yield not only comforting reference points, but
frequently eminently defensible solutions-like the sensi-
ble dominance of the injured party's domicile on the
question of compensatory damages. In any choice-of-law
struggle it is important to probe for the essentials of the
particular problem at hand. In mass-disaster, multi-claim-
ant litigation, in which a number of choice issues may
arise, it is crucial for attorneys to establish a pattern of
sensible arguments, even when the application of such ar-
guments to individual claims does not uniformly favor
their clients. Only by doing so will litigants avoid charges
of opportunistically manipulating a suspect discipline as
well as the debilitating sense on their own part that such a
charge may not be unfounded.
ness conducted within its borders. By the time the primary plaintiff is made whole
by one or more of the defendants, the defendants' conduct toward the plaintiff
should no longer be relevant. See Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Allied Corp., 882
F.2d 254, 257 (7th Cir. 1989); Tokio Marine & Fire Ins. Co. v. McDonnell Douglas
Corp., 465 F. Supp. 790, 799 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd, 617 F.2d 936 (2d Cir. 1980).
Indeed, unless a contribution recovery would violate some legitimate policy of an
interested state, the only relevant question about conduct would appear to be the
determination of the tortfeasors' proportionate share of causation. Such a quanti-
fication is unrelated to modifying or protecting conduct.
Thus, the locale of the tortfeasors' conduct has no rational connection to their
rights to contribution. The frequent statement that the rationale for looking to-
ward the place of the wrong for contribution law is that contribution is a deriva-
tive action does not explain satisfactorily the relevance of the place of the wrong's
law to contribution. See, e.g., Seitter v. Schoenfeld, 678 F. Supp. 831, 837 (D. Kan.
1988). Thus, the Restatement's default to the familiar rule of tort choice-of-law
may simply constitute an expedient escape from the difficulty of making a rational
choice.
